A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power by Weinberg, Louise
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 3 Article 11
A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and
Lawmaking Power
Louise Weinberg
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1057 (2013), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol54/iss3/11
A GENERAL THEORY OF GOVERNANCE:
DUE PROCESS AND LAWMAKING POWER
LOUISE WEINBERG*
ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a general theory describing the nature and
sources of law in American courts. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins is
rejected for this purpose. Better, more general theory is available,
flowing from the Due Process Clauses. At its narrowest, the proposed
theory is consonant with Erie but generalizes it, embracing federal
as well as state law and statutory as well as decisional law in both
state and federal courts. More broadly, beyond this unification of
systemic thinking, the interest-analytic methodology characteristic
of due process extends to a range of substantive constitutional prob-
lems. These include problems concerning both the intrinsic sources
of power and the individual rights that are power’s extrinsic limits.
This Article argues, further, that in rights-based constitutional
litigation, substantial scrutiny should become, and as a practical
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matter is, the general rule, and that certain economic rights should
have the benefit of substantial scrutiny.
 Among the current and recent cases briefly discussed are Sebelius,
the “Obamacare” case; Morrison, the Virginia Tech rape case; Kiobel,
the Nigerian torture case; Kelo, the failed redevelopment case;
Astrue, the in vitro child Social Security case; and Arizona v. United
States, the immigration case.
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I. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
What are the lawmaking powers of state and nation in this
federal union? How are these powers related to the powers of state
and nation in their respective courts? How are these powers related
to the litigation of rights? These questions are of obvious impor-
tance, but we do not seem to have very clear answers. We know
what courts usually say they are doing, but we do not seem to have
a coherent picture of what courts usually do in fact, or what it lies
in their power to do.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,  with its rich intellectual1
foundation—its Holmesian realist understanding of the nature of
law and the role of courts in fashioning it;  its Holmesian positivist2
insistence that law is not law without some relevant lawgiver;  and3
its Austinian insistence on the deference due to judge-made law,
when it applies —should have, and could have, provided a unified4
theory of lawmaking power. But that did not happen. Erie failed to
cover the intellectual ground laid.
For Erie to work as a general theory of American lawmaking
power, the Erie Court would have had to find a way to embrace
federal as well as state law, statutory as well as decisional law, and
state as well as federal courts. The Court would have had to press
Erie’s positivism further to identify the sources of lawmaking power.
And it would have had to address the general problem of allocating
lawmaking power, not only within a state, but among the states,
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I recognize
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate.”); see also O.W. Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”).
3. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (Brandeis, J.) (“The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift
v. Tyson is made clear by Mr. Justice Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the assumption that
there is a transcendental body of law ... but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today
does not exist without some definite authority behind it.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign ... that can be identified.”).
4. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (Brandeis, J.) (“And whether the law of the State shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern.”). See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832)
(arguing that all law, including decisional law, is the positive command of some sovereign).
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and between state and nation. Ideally, a truly general theory would
have seen the relation of power to rights. Having stopped short of
any of this, Erie can offer only a useful point of departure.
Ironically, by 1938, when Erie was decided, the time was ripe for
better theory. Cases in the Hughes Court on the conflict of laws,
federalism, and constitutional analysis  were evolving in tandem to5
a point at which more comprehensive and powerful theory lay ready
to hand.
This Article points to a simple but general way of understanding
the sources and allocation of lawmaking power in the United States,
one that takes hold, more completely and satisfyingly, of the mas-
sive positivistic transformation in American law that is Erie’s signal
achievement. It argues that the teachings of Erie might well be
reconceived, freeing them from Erie’s confines and recognizing Erie
as a reflection of due process. As such, Erie can be read in a
generalized way as holding that the law applied in all courts on any
issue must be the law of a sovereign with a legitimate interest in
governing the particular issue on the particular facts. The general
unifying theory proposed here is best understood, then, as flowing
from the Due Process Clauses, with their attendant interest-
analytic, purposive methodology. Lawyers and judges are already
substantially guided, consciously or not, by the systemic under-
standings of which Erie is a partial reflection.
Beyond this, the Supreme Court’s more substantive constitutional
cases are similarly informed by interest-analytic reasoning—not
only on the scope of government power and its intrinsic limits but
also on the scope of individual rights, which are the extrinsic limits
of power. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
controls irrational state choices of law,  it controls irrational state6
5. The term “constitutional analysis” as used here is to be distinguished from
“constitutional interpretation.” Constitutional interpretation is concerned with the meaning
of the Constitution. Constitutional analysis is concerned with the reason for the government
law or act under challenge, and the reasonableness of the means employed.
6. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.)
(holding forum law inapplicable when the forum’s contacts with a case were insubstantial);
id. at 821-22 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (Brennan, J.)
(requiring as a matter of due process that the forum have sufficient contacts with the
controversy creating governmental interests such that a choice of forum law would not be
arbitrary or unfair)); cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 405-07 (1930) (Brandeis, J.)
(requiring relevance in choice of law under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
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law and arbitrary official state action.  The Fifth Amendment’s Due7
Process Clause has substantially similar significance for constitu-
tional control of federal laws and acts.8
II. A GENERAL THEORY OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER
The presumptive authority of government to act, in any of its
branches, should require only a showing of legitimate governmental
interest. At least since the late 1930s, the sovereign’s legitimate
governmental interest—rational, important, or compelling—or, at
least, its general sphere of interest,  is what sustains an exercise of9
governmental authority. The reader may recognize this sort of
interest-analytic purposive reasoning as characteristic of modern
due process theory.
A. The Curious Dawning of Modern Due Process Theory10
As it happens, by 1938, when Erie was handed down, due process
as grounding a general theory of governmental power was ripe for
deployment. Justice Brandeis could easily have given us more
general theory than he delivered in Erie. Brandeis was author of the
opinion in the 1930 case of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,  the first11
due process case to control a choice of law without reference to
Amendment).
7. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that the Due Process Clause “already prohibits irrational
government action”).
8. The Bill of Rights applies directly, of course, to the federal government, but where it
is silent, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause will be found by some mechanism to
reverse-“incorporate” the unenumerated right. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954) (Warren, C.J.) (finding an equal protection component in the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).
9. A choice rule that would simply identify a “sphere of interest” would be a rough
“jurisdiction-selecting” rule, in the sense of the term as introduced in David F. Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 194 (1933) (making the point
that the identification of a sphere of interest takes place on a preliminary level of thought,
and rarely, if ever, should determine an application of law without further analysis of the
particular issue on the particular facts).
10. For further discussion of material in this Part, see Louise Weinberg, Unlikely
Beginnings of Modern Constitutional Thought, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 291 (2012).
11. 281 U.S. at 407 (striking down irrelevant law as depriving the defendants of property
without due process).
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Lochner v. New York’s “liberty of contract,”  without reference to12
full faith and credit, and without specific reference to the concept of
extraterritoriality. Dick was perhaps the first case of constitutional
magnitude requiring only that law be chosen reasonably—that is,
that the law chosen have substantial relevance to the issue in
dispute on the particular facts.
Dick, a workaday insurance case, utterly unfamiliar to constitu-
tional commentators,  is considered the foundation of modern13
conflicts theory,  the fons et origo of governmental interest analysis14
in the conflict of laws.  Dick is read today as establishing that it is15
unconstitutional for a state without an interest in governing an
issue to attempt to govern it. In Dick, Justice Brandeis took the
unexceptionable but then novel position that it cannot be due
process for a state without any connection with a case to govern it.16
12. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (McReynolds, J.) (“Of course the liberty of contract relating to
labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell
labor.”); cf. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1914) (holding, under the Due
Process Clause and its protection of the liberty of contract, that the forum could not
constitutionally impair the rights of an out-of-state creditor on an out-of-state contract,
notwithstanding that a policy of insurance would be forfeited as a result, contrary to forum
state law); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, 593 (1897) (holding, under the Due
Process Clause, that a state may not interfere with the liberty of a sister-state contract).
13. E-mail from Sanford Levinson to Louise Weinberg (Sept. 27, 2011, 21:13 CST) (on file
with author) (“I think you are on to something extremely interesting and important (and, as
you suspect, unknown to most purported ‘constitutional law’ mavens who simply don’t think
about conflict of laws cases).”) (by permission).
14. The intellectual history is complex. By the 1930s, California was employing
governmental interest analysis in interstate conflicts cases without fanfare, decades before
the important chief justiceship there of Roger Traynor. Cf. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 542 (1935) (observing that the California court below
had discerned “a legitimate public interest” in applying its own law). The seminal article in
the field, at one time reputed to be the greatest law review article ever written, is Brainerd
Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV.
227, 244 (1958) (among other things, demonstrating that the law of the place of contracting,
without other contact with a case, has only a general residual interest in having its law
applied, and that this residual interest is generally creditor-favoring and validating). By
extension, the place of injury, without other contact with a case, could have only a general
residual interest in having its law applied, and this residual interest is generally plaintiff-
favoring, remedial, and deterrent.
15. Brainerd Currie, whose Married Women’s Contracts, supra note 14, revolutionized the
field of conflict of laws, freely credited the Supreme Court for his interest-analytic thinking.
Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 12-14 (1958).
16. 281 U.S. at 407.
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After Dick, the law applied in courts on any issue must be the law
of a relevant lawgiver with a significant interest in governing that
issue on the facts  of the case.17
This thinking is very similar to the thinking in Erie. In Dick, the
Texas courts in a Mexican case disregarded the law of the only
relevant sovereign, Mexico, to apply their own irrelevant law.  In18
Erie, federal judges in state-law cases were disregarding the law of
the only relevant sovereign, the state, to apply their own irrelevant
opinions.  Although in Dick Justice Brandeis deployed Fourteenth19
Amendment due process to strike down irrelevant law, in Erie he
missed the opportunity to deploy Fifth Amendment due process to
strike down irrelevant law.
B. Erie: A Circular and Unconvincing Rationale
Commentators often ignore Justice Brandeis’s constitutional
argument in Erie because, as Professor Urofsky has remarked, they
simply do not understand it.  Perhaps this is because Justice20
Brandeis’s reasoning in Erie can seem circular to current readers
—although it may not have been circular at the time.  To lawyers21
17. It should be noted that the actual facts of Dick were very different from what the
Court thought them to be. See the admirable investigation in Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Who Was
Dick? Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 37. Of course,
what counts is the Court’s perception.
18. In Dick, the plaintiff did allege a permanent residence in Texas. 281 U.S. at 402. But
Justice Brandeis shrugged this off, remarking that at all relevant times Dick resided in
Mexico. Id. at 408 (“The fact that Dick’s permanent residence was in Texas is without
significance. At all times here material, he was physically present and acting in Mexico.”). 
19. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70, 79 (1938) (Brandeis, J.) (“The doctrine
rests upon the assumption ... that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to
what the rules of common law are.”).
20. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 746 (2009); see also, e.g., Donald Earl
Childress III, Redeeming Erie: A Response to Suzanna Sherry, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 155, 156
(2011) (remarking that Erie is an “inkblot”).
21. Of course the nature of American federalism leaves open the possibility that a state
can constitutionally regulate an activity over which the nation may lack power on the
particular facts. But the phenomenon obviously was more common before much of the Bill of
Rights became usable against the states as well as the nation. Even on questions of intrinsic
power, answers to the constitutional question might vary. In the decades before the New Deal
settlement, the Court might in one case strike down a state law attempting to regulate a local
activity as an interference with Congress’s power over interstate commerce, and in another
case deny that an interstate activity was “commerce” within the power of Congress. For
example, in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 276 (1875), the Court held that a state tax on
2013] A GENERAL THEORY OF GOVERNANCE 1065
in our time it is almost a truism to say that if Congress cannot do a
thing it is unconstitutional. That is, if Congress cannot do it, it is
beyond national power altogether. In Erie, Justice Brandeis ex-
plained that federal courts were displacing state law without any
identifiable sovereign interest in doing so, a thing Congress “con-
fessedly” could not do.  The “course pursued” —what federal courts22 23
were doing before Erie—was unconstitutional because Congress
could not do it. But to a modern reader, he can seem to be saying
that the “course pursued” was unconstitutional because it was
unconstitutional.
This confusion is compounded by the inexplicable but ineradicable
conviction of some modern writers  that Erie stands, precisely, for24
its opposite. In their view, the “course pursued” by federal courts
before Erie was unconstitutional because only Congress could
displace state law without any identifiable sovereign interest in
doing so. Of course, this conviction makes no sense. It is not gen-
erally supposed that Congress can do an unconstitutional thing. The
position also seems to reflect a failure to have read the case.
Brandeis was emphatic in Erie that “Congress has no power to
goods sold locally but manufactured in other states was an unconstitutional interference with
Congress’s power over interstate commerce; yet in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918),
the Court held that Congress lacked interstate commerce power to regulate the products of
local labor even if intended to be shipped interstate. Hammer v. Dagenhart also furnishes an
example when the focus is on the police power of a state. Under the rule of Hammer, Congress
lacked power to regulate the conditions of labor because labor is local to a state, while, under
the rule of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-57 (1905), the states also lacked power to
regulate the conditions of labor.
22. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72 (“The federal courts assumed, in the broad field of ‘general law,’
the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact
as statutes.”).
23. Id. at 77-78.
24. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION
172-80 (2000) (seeing Erie as having to do with the primacy of Congress as lawgiver);
UROFSKY, supra note 20, at 346 (same). This sort of thinking traces back at least as far as
Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682,
1682-83 (1974). The most conspicuous current proponent of the separation-of-powers view of
Erie is probably Professor Clark, who joins and has influenced many others in bringing Erie’s
federalism concerns adroitly to bear on separation-of-powers theory. E.g., Bradford R. Clark,
Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1306-07 (2007); Bradford R. Clark,
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1412-22 (2001); see
also Henry Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 761 (2010)
(“Separation of powers thus provides a federalism safeguard.”).
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declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state” —as25
federal courts were doing before Erie. Brandeis repeated the point,
explaining that “[t]he federal courts assumed, in the broad field of
‘general law,’ the power to declare rules of decision which Congress
was confessedly without power to enact as statutes.”26
Nevertheless, there still exist separation-of-powers theorists who
believe that Justice Brandeis must have been wrong about the
powerlessness of Congress. For them, what was unconstitutional
about the “course pursued” was that it produced federal case law, as
though only federal legislation is legitimate federal law, and federal
judicial decisions of common-law questions need not be consulted.
They believe that if anything was declared unconstitutional in Erie
it was federal common law. How, then, do we explain the universal
compulsion among lawyers dealing with federal questions to read
and argue relevant federal cases?
With an almost Orwellian capacity for doublethink, this school of
scholars also believes that federal judicial decisionmaking can, and
indeed must, be authorized by Congress. Federal common law
becomes legitimate when Congress authorizes it.  But this position,27
on its face, also makes no sense. We do not generally suppose that
25. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
26. Id. at 72.
27. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 887 (1986) (exhaustively exploring solutions to the problem of finding
authorization for federal common law and happily concluding that federal common law is
authorized by the grants of federal jurisdiction to federal courts). This position can be helpful
in some contexts. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (Souter, J.)
(arguing that the jurisdictional grant in the Alien Tort Statute implies its exercise);
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104-05, 110 (1938)
(implying federal common-law power from the possibility of a similar case arising within the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)
(implying federal legislative as well as federal judicial lawmaking power from the Article III
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts). But Erie, in effect, is a rejection of the
view that lawmaking power can be implied from a jurisdictional grant. More fundamentally,
lawmaking power is not determined by jurisdiction. It is not due process for a court with
jurisdiction over a case to apply its own law to an issue in the case if it lacks a legitimate
interest in governing that issue. See cases cited supra note 6; see also, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of
the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 852-56 (1997) (linking Erie’s positivism with a
supposed generally accepted view that federal judicial lawmaking must be authorized).
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Congress can authorize an unconstitutional thing. Thus the
separation-of-powers theorists reach a dead end.28
This position, too, suggests that its proponents have yet to read
the case. The rest of us remember Justice Brandeis’s repeated
insistence that it makes no difference to the authority of state law,
when it applies, whether it emanates from the state’s legislature or
its highest court.  This is a central teaching of the opinion.29
Brandeis insists here that case law must not be set at a discount.
This is the positivist position for which Erie, rightly, is most cele-
brated. How, then, can Erie be read as delegitimizing common law
of any kind?
There is one sort of separation-of-powers theorist who is a so-
phisticate and a realist. Whatever Erie says, and whatever Justice
Brandeis meant, this realist has faced up to the indisputable fact
that the Supreme Court, persistently and increasingly, has withheld
federal justice on the astonishingly frank ground that the Justices
do not like providing it, and the Justices may even cite Erie as if it
supported this judicial stance.  It is fair to say that the Justices30
have succeeded in embedding in our jurisprudence the rule that
federal courts have discretion to deny remedies within their power
to allow, coupled with the understanding that federal judges should
be reluctant to provide remedies for violations of federal law—and
with the further understanding that Erie is somehow responsible for
28. It is not surprising that some writers conclude that Erie lacks any coherent
constitutional rationale. See, e.g., Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595
(2008) (arguing that Erie had nothing to do with the Constitution); Jonathan F. Mitchell,
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41-43 & n.158 (2011) (viewing Erie
as a federal common-law policy choice, “not a constitutional command”); see also Abbe R.
Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine,
120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1956 (2011) (suggesting that Erie had to do with “federalism and related
concerns about political accountability, institutional competence, and the risk that federal
courts might make incorrect but unreviewable decisions about state law”).
29. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (Brandeis, J.) (“And whether the law of the State shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern.”).
30. Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726, 729 (Souter, J.) (opining that “modern understandings” of
Erie support withholding an existing federal common-law remedy). For an example of
academic resignation to the sorts of “modern understandings” found in such remarks, see
Monaghan, supra note 24, at 759 n.132 (stating that “current understandings” of Erie deny
to federal courts lawmaking powers coextensive with the powers of Congress, after correctly
noting that, under Swift, federal courts were exercising powers beyond the powers of
Congress).
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this reluctance. The Court itself declares that, with rare exceptions,
courts should defer to Congress by not enforcing acts of Congress
until Congress says in clear language that it really wants its
legislation enforced.  The Court refuses, even in opinions by some31
of its less illiberal members,  to “extend” remedies that already32
exist and would have seemed, on any sensible view, to have been
available.  But to suggest that federal courts lack or ever lacked33
decisional power over questions arising under law Congress could
enact is to fly in the face of Article III, which explicitly extends the
national judicial power to all cases arising under federal law,  a34
power that in our time the Supreme Court deploys in every case
before it, and all federal courts—indeed, given federal supremacy,
all courts—invoke in answer to every federal question.
Erie might have packed more explanatory punch for modern
readers, and perhaps furnished a less handy weapon for defense-
oriented judges, had Brandeis grounded Erie in due process, as he
had grounded Home Insurance Co. v. Dick. Although Brandeis
disliked due process—at least as used in the Lochner era to strike
down progressive state legislation —he joined the due process35
31. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008)
(declining to “extend” the federal common-law action for fraud in the purchase and sale of
securities to actions against secondary actors participating in the deceptive conduct); Cent.
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (same, with respect
to aiders and abettors). Central Bank is in tension with 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006), extending
criminal liability to aiders and abettors of every federal crime, a statute obviously relevant
to the expectations of aiders and abettors. The Court reasons that, unlike joint tortfeasors and
other primary actors, secondary actors such as aiders and abettors could not be held liable in
an action for actual fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. But this reasoning is
inattentive to the purposes of the statute that the federal common-law action enforces,
purposes having to do with ensuring that confidence can be had in the integrity, safety, and
fairness of transactions on the securities exchanges.
32. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (Souter, J.).
33. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (Souter, J.) (declining to “extend” the
existing Bivens cause of action to a case against federal officials who engaged in a prolonged
campaign of harassment and abuse of process intended to force a rancher to forego his Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation for a taking of his land). Had these been state officials
the plaintiff would have been permitted to sue. Id. at 581 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority.”).
35. For recent debate over the significance of this history, see David N. Mayer, The Myth
of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS
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opinion based on Lochner in the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska36
and used due process in Dick.  But Dick was emphatically not based37
on Lochner. Although Dick was a contract case, there is nothing in
the opinion about a Lochnerian liberty of contract. Rather, Dick was
a start at coming to grips with the question a good many conflicts
experts today would say is the only useful question: What are the
governmental interests at stake?  The inquiry into governmental38
interest has to do with the purposes of law and is a necessary part
of due process reasoning.
Ever since Dick, a sovereign without a significant interest in a
case cannot constitutionally govern it. Later Supreme Court cases
on due process in the conflict of laws elaborate on this thinking.
Ever since the Alaska Packers case, it has been understood that
more than one state can have an interest in governing an issue in
a case.  Since Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, it has been under-39
stood that a legitimate governmental interest can arise even after
the events in litigation.  But the Shutts case made clear that forum40
interests that are insubstantial may not be taken into account.41
C. Erie and Due Process
Stated at its broadest level of generality, the explicit constitu-
tional basis of Erie is the lack of national power over questions of
state law.  Under Erie, law in courts requires identification of its42
CONST. L.Q. 217 (2009); Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85
B.U. L. REV. 881 (2005); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and
the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003).
36. 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (McReynolds, J.) (holding, inter alia, that parents have
a due process right to control the rearing of their children and a due process liberty of contract
to provide their children with instruction in a foreign language).
37. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407 (1930).
38. See generally ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); Louise
Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
39. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). For
a similar insight in admiralty, as a matter of federal common law, see Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 582-83 (1953) (Jackson, J.).
40. 449 U.S. 302, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J.).
41. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-20 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding
that in a class action the forum state may not, consistent with due process, govern the rights
of nonresident members of the class).
42. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (Brandeis, J.).
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sovereign source.  The nation is powerless to act except as the43
nation. The national courts may not sit as so many little state
supreme courts, nor may the Supreme Court sit as a super state su-
preme court.  Congress has no power to make state law. Congress44
can only make federal law.  Identification of a national interest,45
then, is prerequisite to the application of national law in courts, just
as, under Dick, identification of a particular state’s interest is
prerequisite to the application of that state’s law in courts.
Although due process did not figure in Justice Brandeis’s opinion
in Erie, it becomes apparent that Erie is satisfied if due process is
satisfied.  The only way Erie could have been written broadly46
enough to comport with the actual everyday experience of lawyers
and judges, and to begin to develop the general theory that ade-
quately describes our two-law, two-court system, would have been
in reliance on due process. Only this more general foundation for
Erie could have enabled the Court to work its way toward a unified,
systemic understanding. It would have empowered the Court to
require that state law, statutory or decisional, apply, when it
applies, in all courts. Under Article VI of the Constitution, federal
law is supreme because “it says so.”  But a due process rationale for47
Erie would have grounded the supremacy of federal law in reason.
Due process would have required federal law, whether statutory or
decisional, to apply, when it applies, in all courts.48
43. Id. at 79.
44. See infra Part III.
45. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State.”). Rather, Congress has power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in the nation. See, e.g., Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, 45
U.S.C. § 51 (2006) (codifying substantive rules governing defenses in cases of personal injury
to employees of interstate railways).
46. See Kermit Roosevelt, Valid Rule Due Process Challenges: Bond v. United States and
Erie’s Constitutional Source, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 988 (2013) (citing Louise Weinberg,
Back to the Future: The New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523, 524 (2004)).
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
48. See immediately following his opinion in Erie, Justice Brandeis’s opinion in
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., in which the Court held, in a case
coming up from a state court, that federal common law must govern interstate water disputes.
304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (“For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
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D. Due Process, Interest Analysis, and the Source of Power
Even more interesting than the Erie-Dick proposition—that a
sovereign without an interest in governing an issue cannot govern
that issue in any court—is its implicit corollary. If a noninterested49
sovereign cannot govern, presumably an interested sovereign can.
Commentators do not appear to have considered the full implica-
tions of this. To see that courts must choose the law of a sovereign
with a legitimate interest in an issue to govern that issue is to grasp
that we already have the elements of a general theory of American
lawmaking power. The proposition that due process requires
nonarbitrary governance has as its necessary consequence that
governmental interest is the measure and source of governmental
power.
The relation of due process to its interest-analytic methodology is
not mysterious. It is basic legal analysis to inquire into the reason
for a rule. What is the purpose—the point—of an assertion of gov-
ernmental power? Lawyers ask the question because they under-
stand that the scope of the government’s purpose will determine the
scope of its power. Law exceeding the scope of its purpose is law
without reason, and law without reason is no law at all. Without
reason, law is arbitrary and irrational and is not due process. And
the political branches have no greater power than the courts to act
beyond the sphere of the government’s legitimate interests.50
Due process, in other words, limits all governmental authority,
not only when the existence of governmental authority is challenged
directly, but also when a governmental interest is asserted in
justification of some alleged abridgment of a constitutional right. It
between the two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither the statutes
nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.”).
49. Professor Currie used the phrase “the disinterested” state. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie,
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754 (1963). I am using
“noninterested” to clarify that I am not talking about neutrality but simply a want of
meaningful connection.
50. For one among many prominent statements of this fundamental proposition, see
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541 (2005) (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), terming that case “a historic decision holding that a [law] would
survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not ‘clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare’” (emphasis omitted)).
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follows that what empowers government is the government’s reason
for taking action. A sovereign’s legitimate governmental interest
will authorize that sovereign to act, but only within the scope of that
interest—and, of course, only if within the extrinsic substantive
requirements of the Constitution. This is the heart of the lesson
Chief Justice Marshall taught two hundred years ago, when he
declared, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”51
Indeed, a sovereign’s interest in applying its law on the particular
issue in the particular case is the only presumptive source of its
authority to do so. In other words, a legitimate interest must ground
all exercises of governmental power, whether the sovereign makes
law in its executive, legislative, or judicial departments; and it is the
province and duty of the judicial department to choose, apply, and
test law in light of these understandings.
In sum, governmental interest analysis—the chief characteristic
of due process thinking—is the key to the source of governmental
power.
III. REACHING FOR MORE GENERAL THEORY
A. The Bearing of Carolene Products
In 1938 the Supreme Court, undertaking to reexamine its shifting
stances on government power, arrived at the same interest-depend-
ent conclusion we have just reached. Here I am not talking about
Erie, although Erie is relevant, but rather about Carolene
Products.52
Although Carolene Products was a case about the commerce
power of Congress, the Court focused on the company’s argument
that an act of Congress regulating artificial milk was a deprivation
of property without due process of law.  At root, Justice Stone’s due53
51. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (building on the views of
Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NOS. 19, 33).
52. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (Stone, J.).
53. Id. at 147-48. The due process argument in Carolene Products was not about a
2013] A GENERAL THEORY OF GOVERNANCE 1073
process argument in Carolene Products was the natural corollary of
the due process argument that Justice Brandeis had made in
Dick—that a government without a governmental interest in an
issue, cannot, consistent with due process, govern that issue. In
Carolene Products, the Court held it no violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause for Congress to regulate artificial
milk.  The Court saw that there must be national power to deal54
with national problems. The Court identified the problem as
national by first sustaining the legislation at issue under the
Commerce Clause.  Justice Stone reasoned that when law is in55
furtherance of some legitimate governmental interest, it is presump-
tively constitutional. Due process requires of law only that it have
“some rational basis” —that is, that it be justified by some legit-56
imate governmental interest.
By some odd coincidence, Carolene Products was handed down on
the same day as Erie. But just as Erie, read broadly, teaches that
relevant common law must be allowed to govern in all courts, when
it applies, Carolene Products, read broadly, teaches that relevant
statutory law must be allowed to govern in all courts, when it
applies.
With Justice Stone’s opinion in Carolene Products, the Hughes
Court crystallized its new deference to reasonable economic regu-
lation. As long as government has some rational basis—a legitimate
governmental interest—for its ordinary legislation, that legislation,
if otherwise constitutional, will pass constitutional muster.
Lochner-style deprivation of “liberty,” see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), but
rather about a deprivation of property.
54. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 148.
55. Id. at 147-48. Interestingly, here the enumeration of the commerce power served as
identification of a general sphere of interest, although in itself it could not help to identify the
significant interest within that sphere.
56. Id. at 152 (“[L]egislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed
it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis.”
(emphasis added)); cf. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532,
543 (1935) (Stone, J.) (“Indulging the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every
state statute, we cannot say that this one, as applied, lacks a rational basis or involved any
arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of state power.”).
1074 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1057
B. The “Bite” of Minimal Scrutiny: Pretty Strict Scrutiny in Fact
By referring to “legitimate governmental interest,” I do not mean
to suggest that courts are, or should be, satisfied with a minimal
showing of “some rational basis” for whatever government does. In
the early decades following the New Deal settlement, as the
Supreme Court began to defer to legislative will, the Court arguably
might have been criticized as accepting a contrived argument too
readily as furnishing a rational basis.  But rational-basis scrutiny57
today has, or should have, sufficient “bite”  to ensure that an ac-58
tionable exercise of government power is not held justified by
trumped-up, vague, abstract, speculative, or ill-assorted “reasons.”
Scrutiny of every challenged government act or law needs to be
rigorous enough to require answers to the questions that able
counsel will raise in any event.
To be sure, today the Supreme Court generally does follow the
regime of tiered scrutiny derived from Carolene Products’ Footnote
Four —surely the most famous footnote in the galaxy. The Court59
held that in cases involving fundamental rights, in cases involving
inherently suspect classifications, or in cases in which the political
process is likely to be unavailing, the interest shown must be more
than rational—it must be “compelling.” In such cases the means
must do more than merely “fit” the ends. Means must be narrowly
tailored and proportional.  Less restrictive alternatives must be60
explored.
57. Commonly cited as illustrative are Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-32 (1963),
and Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
58. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628-29 (1996) (applying heightened rational-basis
scrutiny); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452-53 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (describing heightened rational-basis scrutiny); id. at 458-60 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out the new stringency of the Court’s
“rational basis” scrutiny); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972) (discussing tiered scrutiny and coining the terminology of rational
basis with “bite”). 
59. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (seeing a possible need for heightened scrutiny
of governmental action affecting “discrete and insular minorities,” abridging specific
enumerated rights, or in cases in which the political process may be unavailing).
60. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“There must be
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.”).
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In theory, then, rational-basis scrutiny presumes constitutionality
and strict scrutiny does not. But this notion defies common sense
and experience. All laws, and most official acts, are presumed
constitutional. Presumably the government acts for reasons. It is up
to the challenger to show that there is too serious an abridgment of
right or too unconvincing a governmental interest. The exceptions
to this presumption of constitutionality generally arise in cases of
alleged official misconduct rather than in challenges to legislation,
although of course there is substantial overlap in constitutional
litigation, given that the challenge is often to both law and the act
of enforcing it.
I would suggest that in all cases, astute counsel will raise the
same questions, without regard to the “tiers” of scrutiny. The initial
question will be: what legitimate governmental interests are to be
served by applying or sustaining the challenged law or validating
the challenged act on the facts of the particular case? But the gov-
ernment act or law does not have a “rational” basis if the proffered
reasons for it are not credible in light of the means the government
has used. So counsel must ask the court to consider the fit of means
to ends. And counsel will argue that there were more reasonable
steps the government could have taken, if in fact there were. At any
level of scrutiny, law is not due process when it sweeps within its
orbit conduct beyond the scope of its asserted purposes, or is so
constricted in scope or application as to appear targeted and dis-
criminatory, or imposes burdens so heavy as to be disproportionate
to the government’s interests.
By no means should objection be raised to these questions on the
ground that rational-basis scrutiny does not require them. On the
contrary, it invites them.
C. The Triumph of Interest Analysis
After Carolene Products and Footnote Four, modern constitu-
tional thought has become almost entirely interest-analytic, and not
only in the jurisprudence of due process. When a constitutional
challenge is to some government act or law allegedly abridging a
fundamental right, or abridging the rights of minorities or others for
whom the political process may be unavailing, substantive due
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process thinking, as a practical matter, will control the case however
it has been litigated, briefed, and argued,  in state as well as61
federal courts.
Today due process is also the underlying measure of the power of
government, whether of nation or state—the latter, of course,
always subject to federal supremacy. This direct application of due
process to the bare question of government authority follows from
Erie and Dick but is also a logical corollary of the role of interest-
analysis in government defenses to rights-based litigation.
In thinking about government authority as an original matter,
due process provides significant advantages over doctrinal com-
merce reasoning and other areas of formulaic black letter on gov-
ernment power. Due process can ground a general theory applicable
to all lawmaking power, whether of nation or state, whether
asserted in courts or legislatures, whether enumerated or inherent,
and comes with a built-in framework for analysis in these varied
contexts.
IV. ARTICLE I AND THE LIMITS OF ENUMERATION62
A. Lists, Tests, Factors
At the turn of last century, the era remembered as the Gilded
Age, the powers of governance were thought to be capable of cate-
gorical enumeration. The powers of Congress were to be found in the
enumerations of Article I, and the powers of the states were to be
found in lists of “police powers” set out in cases. This confidence in
lists as authoritative sources of power had become a serious obstacle
to governance. Until the age of modernism, these two sets of
enumerations were thought to be not only stringently limited but
61. That substantive due process governs the constitutionality of state action has become,
in large part, a literal fact. Most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and
unenumerated rights as well, are held “incorporated” into the “liberty” protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The notable exceptions are the Third
Amendment right against involuntary quartering of soldiers, the Fifth Amendment right to
indictment by grand jury, and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases
worth more than twenty dollars.
62. The titles of the following two Parts are cribbed from Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III,
and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2010).
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also mutually exclusive. Some matters, falling under neither
heading, could become ungovernable altogether.63
Yet a government must have power to govern. By the 1930s, in
the struggle of the New Deal administration to pull the country out
of the Great Depression, the old imagined categorical limits on
governance had ceased to be convincing. Today, it is increasingly
understood that categorical approaches to the “vertical” conflict of
laws—that is, to the problems of federalism—do not work very well.
Ironically, constitutional enumerations of the powers of the respec-
tive branches, the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of nondelegated
powers to the states or the people, and the common-law lists of the
states’ police powers, have all served, not to empower governance by
nation or state but rather to obstruct it.
National power is continually contested despite the fact that the
Constitution deletes the word “expressly” from the Delegation
Clause of the Tenth Amendment. The failure of the Articles of
Confederation of 1781 is thought to be in some part attributable to
the inclusion of the word “expressly” in its delegation clause.  There64
is originalist support from the Founding Era for both sides of the
debate on whether to take the Constitution’s omission of the word
seriously.  Because we do not have a definitive answer, we may as65
well simply be guided by the text of the Tenth Amendment, which
does not make express delegations exclusive.
Chief Justice Marshall’s Federalist reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland  was enraging to the slave66
states at the time, but we can put the Civil War behind us and allow
ourselves a more nationalist understanding in harmony with his.
The Framers understood that they could not anticipate every exi-
gency of governance and therefore could not enumerate every power
inherent in the nation’s sovereignty. Their insertion of a Necessary
63. On this dysfunction see supra note 21.
64. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II, available at http://teachingamerican
history.org/ratification/tansill/articles-of-confederation.html (“Each State retains its sover-
eignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by
this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”).
65. See, e.g., Kurt Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment,
Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1891-92
(2008) (arguing that it is wrong to read the omission of the word “expressly” in the Tenth
Amendment as an acknowledgment of unenumerated delegations of power).
66. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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and Proper Clause, as Chief Justice Marshall explained in
McCulloch, gives the nation all needful powers of national gover-
nance. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, all needed power,
whether enumerated or inherent, is delegated, and need be given
only its rational scope. Marshall explained that if the purposes of
the federal government are legitimate—in the sense that they are
national or multistate or evoked by some need properly of national
concern—and if they are otherwise constitutional,  the reasonable67
means the government employs to achieve them are constitutional
as well.
The New Deal settlement was an attempt to reestablish these
understandings. Nevertheless there are continuing efforts to fight
the battle of the 1930s—indeed, to fight the Civil War—all over
again. The favored method today seems to be a close, literalistic
reading of the precise terms of the enumerated powers.  Yet enu-68
merations are of very little help in thinking about the sources and
limits of governmental power. 
Take the states’ “police powers.” The Court long ago abandoned
the supposition that a judge-made list of “police powers,” however
traditional, should limit needed governance by a state. The modern
reader trying to fathom what the Lochner Court imagined it was ac-
complishing, comes up against a senseless controversy over whether
a maximum work-hours law affecting bakeshops was an exercise of
the police power over “health,” in which case it would be constitu-
tional, or over “labor,” in which case it would not. The state could
not be allowed to interfere with the “liberty” of employment con-
tracts.  Obviously, work-hours laws interfere with employment69
67. Observe, incidentally, the Footnote Four sort of hedging that permeates Marshall’s
celebrated declaration of national empowerment. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
The author of Marbury v. Madison was careful to preserve the role of courts in the rule of law
even while describing maximum authority in Congress to govern in the national interest. This
is the power acknowledged in Carolene Products but hedged and made only presumptive by
Footnote Four.
68. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587-88 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.) (reading Congress’s power to “regulate,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, as
necessarily implying that the power exercised be “regulatory” in the sense of restraining or
prohibiting, as opposed to mandating); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (reading the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend XIV, § 5, as confining Congress to acts that are purely “remedial” in the sense
of nonsubstantive).
69. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 55-57 (1905).
2013] A GENERAL THEORY OF GOVERNANCE 1079
contracts even if they are “health” measures. What possible dif-
ference could this sort of inquiry make to a state government with
a legitimate interest in regulating the hours of work of the state’s
bakers? Would it not have been better for courts to consider the
apparent exigency that brought the disputed regulation forth,  and70
the suitability of the regulation enacted to meet that exigency?
The futility of relying upon enumeration on some approved list to
answer questions of power can be appreciated at the national level
as well. The essential national powers—Congress’s powers over
interstate commerce,  taxation,  and spending,  as well as the71 72 73
federal judiciary’s power over all federal questions —are enumer-74
ated.  Stare at the Commerce Clause as you will, you will gain no75
enlightenment about its application in a particular case. It is true
that the existence of “enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated,”  but it is also true that the Constitution affords the76
legitimate ends of government all the “necessary and proper” means
to effectuate them.  The enumeration of powers in the Constitution77
does not resolve cases; it simply poses at a new level a host of
begged questions.  At best the enumeration of a particular power78
70. See TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FACTORY INSPECTORS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
42-43 (1896); see also AARON BOBROW-STRAIN, WHITE BREAD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE STORE-
BOUGHT LOAF (2012); David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to
the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 299 (Michael E. Dorf ed.,
2009).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72. Id. cl. 1.
73. Id.
74. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)
(Marshall, C.J.).
75. See the potentially damaging new restriction on the spending power in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (denying
Congress’s power, as “coercive,” to condition continued funding of state-administered Medicaid
on the state’s consent to expansion of the program). For early criticism see Neal K. Katyal,
Op-Ed., A Pyrrhic Victory, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A21.
76. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing that Congress shall have power “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
78. Cf. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405 (“[T]he question respecting the extent of the
powers actually granted [to the Federal Government] is perpetually arising, and will probably
continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.”).
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is evidence that the universe of subjects to which the enumeration
refers is within the sovereign’s general sphere of interest. It cannot
decide particular cases.
Yet divining the existence of national power can be, in a sense, too
easy. The Supreme Court may too often have been content to end
inquiry at what is a preliminary level of analysis, too easily satisfied
by identifying a sphere of interest, announcing a jurisdiction-
selecting rule  that the nation has inherent general power over79
some nationwide, multistate, or international class of questions.80
Often this conclusion is based on a presumed need for uniformity,81
a rationale which might just as well mandate what the law in ques-
tion would prohibit.
Equally questionable is the Court’s habit of overly obsequious def-
erence to the states. It is questionable, for example, that federal
courts should abnegate a jurisdiction conferred by turning away
diversity cases raising questions of family law,  or that they should82
apply state law to govern a federal question touching some area of
state concern, when the federal question rationally requires a
federal answer.83
79. See Cavers, supra note 9, at 194.
80. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-29 (1964) (Harlan,
J.) (fashioning a federal common-law rule that courts may not adjudicate the validity of an
act of a foreign state, reasoning that the risk that courts might trench on the executive branch
in dealing with the foreign relations of the United States raised questions that are
“intrinsically federal,” so that state law could not be applied to them even though state law
would come out the same way). Justice White dissented, pointing out that the Court was
validating a “lawless” act. Id. at 439.
81. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (Douglas, J.)
(holding that federal law must govern the duties of the United States on its own commercial
paper because of the “vast scale” of federal programs and the desirability of “a uniform rule”).
However, the purpose of the Works Progress Administration check at issue, distributed
during the Great Depression, would better have been served by assuring those asked to accept
such a check that their rights under the usual rules of commercial law were preserved. See
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (McReynolds, J.) (holding that the uniformity
of federal admiralty law would be disturbed by permitting the state in which a harbor worker
resided to provide workers’ compensation benefits to his widow). At the time, no federal
admiralty remedy existed, and there was therefore no federal admiralty law the uniformity
of which could have been disturbed. Justice McReynolds was able to defeat the widow’s right
to workers’ compensation under state law by viewing the defendant railway company in its
capacity as shipowner rather than railway, and the plaintiff’s decedent as if he had been a
seaman instead of a longshoreman. Id. at 212, 217.
82. E.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
83. See, e.g., California v. Arc-Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (in an action for price-fixing
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The reasons for an exercise of governmental power, on the par-
ticular facts of the particular issue in the particular case, will not
only justify the exercise but also limit its scope. The government’s
purposes are the first of two rational intrinsic limits of its power and
cannot be exceeded without a violation of due process. These pur-
poses must be beneficent—that is, intended to further the general
welfare. The law manifesting them is likely to have particularly
intended beneficiaries and will have regulatory effects on those
whose conduct it intends to constrain or prohibit.
The second intrinsic limit on governance is the requirement of a
rational relation of means to ends. This relation is important
because it tests the authenticity of the government’s alleged pur-
poses. The Justices sometimes appear to think of a law’s over-
breadth, underinclusiveness, or disproportionality as a secondary
consideration—an afterthought, looked into to support or impugn a
result. On the contrary, these inquiries are among the intrinsic
limits of governmental power. The extrinsic limits of governmental
power are, of course, the rights of individuals.
What is argued here, then, is that the source of governmental
power lies within a sphere of legitimate governmental interest; that
the scope of a government’s authority to exercise its power in a
given instance is determined by the scope of its interest in applica-
tion of its law or other assertion of its power over a particular issue
on the particular facts in a particular case; and that the relation of
the government’s means to its purposes determines the legitimacy
of the exercise of power.
B. The Obamacare Case
Of the various tests of governmental power devised by the
Supreme Court over time, virtually none have proved workable in
the long run. In former times courts might have considered whether
under the Sherman Antitrust Act, applying state law to allow proportionate distribution of
liquidated damages to indirect purchasers, in disregard of the direct purchasers’ right to the
whole under the federal rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)); cf. Louise
Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1760-
62 (1992) (arguing that if the evident unfairness of Illinois Brick produced this result, the
correct course would have been for the Court to overrule Illinois Brick rather than to blind
itself to the conflict between Illinois Brick and the state law applied).
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goods were in transit or had come to rest within a state.  All goods84
not actually in transit are at rest, and with rare exceptions all are
entirely within some state. How can such facts matter to the regu-
lation of nationwide markets or nationwide industries? Why should
it matter whether an activity affecting interstate commerce takes
place within a state?  Very few do not. How can anyone predict85
whether an effect on commerce will be perceived as direct or
indirect?  And so on.86
In the current state of the jurisprudence, under United States v.
Lopez,  courts ask: Is this a person or thing in interstate com-87
merce?  Is it a channel, agent, mode, or instrumentality of inter-88
state commerce?  Is it an activity affecting interstate commerce?89 90
If an “activity affecting,” is it an economic, commercial activity?  Is91
the link between the activity and its effect on commerce too atten-
uated to count, so that one must “pile inference upon inference” to
suppose that Congress has power?92
These tests are an improvement over their predecessors, in that
the government tends to win the argument when governance is
prudent. But they seem problematic—not because an uncontrolled
Congress is a good thing, but because valuable legislation should
not be trashed without good reason. Recall that what was struck
down in Lopez was an act of Congress criminalizing the possession
of guns near schools.  We surely have a recurrent problem of school93
shootings,  and there is massive, long-exercised federal power over94
84. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-76 (1918) (holding Congress
powerless to regulate products of child labor intended for interstate shipment).
85. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1936) (striking down the
protections for labor in the Bituminous Coal Act as beyond Congress’s commerce power
because coal mining is intrastate).
86. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 359 (1903).
87. 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (striking down as beyond Congress’s power over interstate
commerce a federal statute criminalizing the possession of guns near schools).
88. Id. at 551.
89. Id. at 558.
90. Id. at 558-59.
91. Id. at 559.
92. Id. at 567.
93. Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2006).
94. See generally NILS BÖCKLER ET AL., SCHOOL SHOOTINGS: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH,
CASE STUDIES, AND CONCEPTS FOR PREVENTION (2012); KATHERINE S. NEWMAN ET AL.,
RAMPAGE: THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS (2005); Newtown, Conn., School
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firearms and their possession, as well as acknowledged commerce
power over the national market for them.  Since the purpose of that95
market is to provide possession, and since federal crimes of pos-
session are common—think, for example, of the crime of possession
of narcotics —there was little sense in striking down the Gun Free96
School Zones Act  on any theory.97
The current Court may be poised to expand on, limit, or even
abandon Lopez—or in some way to put its own spin on the Com-
merce Clause. In National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,  the Obamacare case, the Court, by Chief Justice Roberts,98
made scant use of Lopez. The Chief Justice was nevertheless able to
delete the Commerce Clause as a source of power to enact the
Affordable Care Act’s  “individual mandate,” the requirement that99
individuals buy insurance or pay a penalty.  The Chief Justice100
achieved this by ringing in a new test of commerce power, recently
urged by myriad conservative pundits and journalists, that
Congress can regulate “activity” but not “inactivity.”  This tight101
parsing of the word “activity” is of particular interest, because the
Commerce Clause does not mention it. The word “activities” appears
in Lopez, in one of its three categories of matters within the com-
merce power of Congress.102
This distinction between “activity” and “inactivity” was not the
only new weapon deployed against the controversial individual man-
date. Still parsing the Commerce Clause closely, the Chief Justice
declared that legislation regulating activities affecting commerce
must be regulatory.  Congress has power to limit and prohibit but103
not, apparently, to require. Yet as Justice Ginsburg pointed out,
dissenting, the nation exercises acknowledged power to provide
Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
subjects/s/school_ shootings/index.html (including references to other articles on recent school
shootings).
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
96. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
98. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).
100. Id. 
101. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2586.
102. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
103. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2586-87, 2590-91.
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health insurance itself, as it already does, with Medicare.  How104
can legislation devolving the rest of the job on private commercial
insurers divest Congress of commerce power? Is there anything so
impressive about the words “activity” and “regulate” that they can
do a better job than all the words brought to bear on Congress’s
commerce power in the past?
Chief Justice Roberts’ new obstructions for Congress were not the
only visible signs of dissatisfaction with Lopez. This same Term, in
Alderman v. United States, Justice Thomas authored a revelatory
dissent to a denial of certiorari.  Justice Thomas explained, or105
rather complained, that in denying certiorari the Court “tacitly
accept[ed] the nullification of our recent Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.”  Thomas was specific about this: 106
Joining other Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has decided that an implicit assumption of constitution-
ality in a 33-year-old statutory interpretation opinion carves out
a separate constitutional place for statutes like the one in this
case and pre-empts a careful parsing of post-Lopez case law.  107
In Thomas’s view, “[t]hat logic threatens the proper limits on
Congress’ commerce power and may allow Congress to exercise
police powers that our Constitution reserves to the States.”108
Evidently the various categories and requirements of Lopez, the
“careful parsing” of which is so desired by Justice Thomas, have not
been applied without debate or difficulty in the United States
Courts of Appeals.109
104. Id. at 2628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
105. 131 S. Ct. 700, 700 (2011) (denying certiorari in United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d
641 (9th Cir. 2010)). This case marks a new tendency in the United States Courts of Appeals
to rely on pre-Lopez authority. In Alderman, the Ninth Circuit had relied on Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), which held that proof that a firearm had moved in
interstate commerce provided a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to ground a federal
prosecution for possession of a firearm. Alderman, 565 F.3d at 643. This use of Scarborough
was in disregard of United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), and thus of Lopez, which relied
on Bass. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
106. Alderman, 131 S. Ct. at 700 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Alderman, 565 F.3d 641 (2010).
107. Alderman, 131 S. Ct. at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id.
109. For other examples of the courts of appeals’ struggles with Lopez, see United States
v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2010); Keys v. United States, 545 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir.
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A measure of the fragility of the new Sebelius tests is that the
power to tax can obliterate them, as the Sebelius Court in effect held
when it sustained the individual mandate.  Today, it would seem110
that taxation itself is well within the commerce power. It makes
scant sense to distinguish the taxation of economic activity or
nonactivity from other regulation of economic activity or nonac-
tivity.  Fortunately, because the mandate was sustained on this111
other ground,  it became unnecessary to have reached the question112
of commerce power, although the Chief Justice played the trick of
deciding that issue first.  It is now open to counsel to argue, and to113
judges to conclude, that the Commerce Clause ruling in the
Obamacare case was obiter dictum.
The Court seems not to have thought very deeply about the chief
difficulty presented by the analyses in either Sebelius or Lopez, as
applied to the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate. Neither
Sebelius nor Lopez acknowledges the possibility of the sort of
dysfunction in the interstate system that can give rise to an exigent
corrective national interest. Yet these sorts of interests are com-
monly held to authorize legislation under the Commerce Clause.
Consider that, under its commerce power, Congress has thus far
been permitted to enact antipollution law—a Clean Water Act  and114
a Clear Air Act —evidently because a downstream or downwind115
state cannot protect itself from a neighboring state with lax
environmental controls. There is always pressure on state legisla-
tures and governors to avoid action costly to local enterprise. The
consequence can be multistate degradation of the environment—in
effect a classic “tragedy of the commons.”  Multistate dysfunction116
might not satisfy every post-Lopez or pre-Lopez formal test of
interstate commerce, but it would justify action by Congress.
2008); United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chesney,
86 F.3d 564, 580 n.11 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder, J., concurring); United States v. Bishop, 66
F.3d 569, 603 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594-95 (2012).
111. Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., A Confused Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A25.
112. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
113. Id. at 2584-93.
114. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
843 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
115. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
116. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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The Sebelius Court made little of the argument that a nationwide
failure of collective action in the health insurance market, encourag-
ing the growth of a population that shifts the costs of its care to
others—costs amounting to billions of dollars nationwide—must
give rise to a national interest in correcting it.  Congress, of course,117
on any sensible view, has commerce power over the national market
for health insurance, and in the face of a failure of collective action
generating a free rider problem, has a legitimate governmental
interest in regulating behavior to prevent that nationwide market
failure. This conclusion has nothing to do with whether the free
riders’ behavior is “activity” or “inactivity,” or with the differences
between proscribing and prescribing. It has everything to do with a
legitimate national governmental interest, and the appropriateness
of the means used to address that concern.
The assault on national power in Sebelius was not limited to
Congress’s commerce power. Chief Justice Roberts went on to attack
Congress’s ability to condition spending when federal funds go to
the states. Scrutinizing the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of
Medicaid, the existing program providing medical care to the indi-
gent and disabled, the Court held that Congress may not earmark
the money it gives to the states to fund Medicaid—not without a
state’s consent.  Nor may Congress exclude the rejecting state from118
the Medicaid program for withholding its consent. That would be
“coercive.”119
This startling new limit on the spending power is a serious
impediment to national governance. It is also a serious impediment
to public health. It confides to the discretion of each state the
decision whether or not its indigent residents can have access to
ordinary medical care without having to resort to emergency rooms.
The costs of their doing so are merely shifted and are more sub-
stantial than the costs of ordinary medical care. Sadly, the costs of
117. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 2601 (majority opinion). The new limits on conditional spending seem in tension
with the Court’s previous tolerance for arguably unconstitutional conditions. Cf. Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (sustaining regulations of the Department of Health and Human
Services which prohibit Title X projects from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and
activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning). For current discussion, see
Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV.
479 (2012).
119. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-07.
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their illnesses can fall on indigent uninsured residents themselves,
in needless suffering. Or, worse, their untreated illnesses can
threaten the health of others, risks that cannot be contained within
state lines.
C. The Virginia Tech Rape Case
The Lopez tests of national power can also fail to capture the
national interest in dealing with a widespread failure of state
justice. To take a somewhat analogous example, in enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1871  under its Fourteenth Amendment120
power,  Congress was attempting to deal with the terrorist tactics121
of the Ku Klux Klan, including the effects of Klan terrorism on
courts throughout the defeated South.  In the debate preceding the122
enactment of the Civil Rights Act, one congressman described the
situation:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear,
hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and
petit juries act as if they might be accomplices.... [A]ll the
apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes
of justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes
and feared detection. Among the most dangerous things an
injured party can do is to appeal to justice.123
Here one can see a collapse of justice in states throughout the
South, generating a national remedial interest, and can see how
that interest empowered Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act.
120. Today codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
122. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-42 (1972) (“If the State courts had proven
themselves competent to suppress the local disorders, or to maintain law and order, we should
not have been called upon to legislate.... We are driven by existing facts to provide for the
several states in the South ... the full and complete administration of justice in the courts.”
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST SESS. 374-76 (1871) (statement of Sen. Osborne))).
123. Id. at 241 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST SESS. 460 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Perry)).
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A later narrowing construction of the Fourteenth Amendment124
has meant that the battery of civil rights laws enacted during the
Johnson administration in the 1960s had to be sustained under
Congress’s commerce power instead.  Yet surely a widespread125
failure of the states at the time to secure the civil rights of all
persons within their borders was part of the justification for the
national civil rights legislation of the 1960s, and a more plausible
basis for the legislation than any consumption of sister-state pro-
duce,  just as it was a widespread failure of state justice that126
empowered Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
This brings us to United States v. Morrison.  There, the Court127
struck down a part of the Violence Against Women Act affording
battered women a private right to sue the batterer.  The Court128
concluded that this private right of action was beyond the power of
Congress under either the Commerce Clause  or the Fourteenth129
Amendment.130
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist had to acknowl-
edge that Congress made substantial findings in support of the
legislation.  But Congress emphasized, and Rehnquist chose to131
focus on, findings on the impact of violence against women on the
victims and their families.  There was also much in the findings132
about the impact of domestic violence on welfare, as well as work.133
But these emphases of Congress and amici were an artifact of
Lopez’s insistence that “activities affecting” interstate commerce be
124. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-24 (1883) (interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as authorizing civil rights legislation to control only state, not private, action).
125. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964)
(sustaining Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, under Congress’s commerce
power rather than its Fourteenth Amendment power; noting the impact on interstate
commerce of discrimination against black travelers in places of public accommodation).
126. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (sustaining Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, under Congress’s commerce power over discrimination
against black travelers in places of public accommodation, in part on the theory that places
such as Ollie’s Barbecue used produce shipped interstate).
127. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006).
129. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
130. Id. at 627
131. Id. at 614.
132. Id. at 614-16.
133. See id. at 636 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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“economic.”  There was less in the findings tending to show the134
unwillingness or inability or simple failure of state and local
authorities to protect women from domestic or other violence or to
furnish redress for it.
The record in Morrison is ambiguous. It can as easily be read as
suggesting that the plaintiff was lying about being raped as it can
be read as illustrating the problem of denials of justice in such
cases. The defendant University had waffled in remediation of the
plaintiff’s complaint, in the end standing behind its football heroes;
and a Virginia grand jury had refused to indict them.  Even135
supposing, however, that in some fraction of cases brought under
the Act the plaintiffs will be lying, all that Congress had attempted
to give a woman here was a chance to try to prove her case.
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Congress had made
some findings documenting state and local failures to remedy
violence against women, going so far as to say that these findings,
too, were “voluminous.”  But the Chief Justice pointed out that136
“the Fourteenth Amendment place[s] certain limitations on the
manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct....
Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored principle that
the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state
action.... That Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”  By ringing in this137
unexceptionable admonition, Rehnquist manipulatively shifted the
referent of the words “conduct” and “discriminatory” and “wrongful,”
transmuting what was essentially an allegation of official wrong
into an allegation of rape. Whatever the intent of Congress underly-
ing other provisions of the statute,  these unemphasized congres-138
sional findings bore obvious relevance to Congress’s provision in the
legislation of the challenged private right of action. Had these
134. See id. at 610-11 (majority opinion).
135. Michael Greve usefully detailed this background in a question to me from the floor at
the Conference on Federalism and Its Future, University of Texas School of Law, Austin (Feb.
12, 2011).
136. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-20 (“[The] assertion that there is pervasive bias in various
state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence is supported by a
voluminous congressional record.”).
137. Id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Cf. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1032805, at *23-24.
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findings been given full value, the nation might not have lost the
private cause of action in the Violence Against Women Act.  And139
the Court would not have been able to suppose as blithely as it had
that Congress was addressing the local crime of rape rather than a
nationwide failure of justice.
V. ARTICLE III AND THE LIMITS OF ENUMERATION
A. The Nigerian Torture Case
In an earlier article I dealt with the advantages that due process
reasoning could provide in cases raising questions of federal
jurisdiction under Article III.  I will not revisit the cases discussed140
there. But I should point out that the question of jurisdiction and its
relation to the national interest has moved to the forefront in the
waning days of the 2011-2012 Term with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.141
Kiobel began as a federal action by an alien for a tort in violation
of the law of nations, fitting the odd requirements of an ancient
grant of federal jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute.  Kiobel also142
more or less matches the peculiar facts of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,143
139. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C, 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.), requires
reauthorization every five years, and Congress has reauthorized it repeatedly, sans the
private cause of action struck down in Morrison. See Sen. Chris Coons, Violence Against
Women Act Must Be Reauthorized, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/chris-coons/violence-against-women-ac_b_1249516.html. At the time of
writing this, in May of 2012, S.1925, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2011, was languishing in Congress. Previous such reauthorizations have been bipartisan, but
in this Congress, the bill’s support is largely on the Democrats’ side of the aisle. The bill
makes changes intended to be both economizing and progressive. Senator Chris Coons, a
sponsor of the bill and member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, noted the intention of the
reauthorization is “to keep pushing federal, state and local government to do more to save
lives and serve victims.” See Coons, supra.
140. Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 BYU
L. REV. 731.
141. 621 F.3d 111, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that corporate defendants have no liability
within the jurisdiction provided by the Alien Tort Statute), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472, 472-
73 (2011).
142. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006))
(the “Alien Tort Statute”).
143. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (taking jurisdiction of an
action by Paraguayan relatives of a Paraguayan tortured to death by a Paraguayan official
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the famous Second Circuit case taking jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute of a case on wholly foreign facts, to found a modern
jurisprudence of universal jurisdiction and human rights.
The original question before the Supreme Court in Kiobel was
whether there could be corporate liability for aiding and abetting
official torture of Nigerian citizens in Nigeria. The claim invoked the
federal common-law action implied by Filartiga and its progeny
under the Alien Tort Statute.
The foreign corporate defendants in Kiobel did not trouble to
argue a jurisdictional question when the case was first argued
before the Supreme Court. The defendants may have considered any
jurisdictional question in the case settled, or may have preferred on
this occasion to settle the issue of corporate liability vel non. Nor did
the defendants raise the considerable difficulties now attending
implied actions against aiders and abettors.  But at the time I144
thought the more interesting question had to do with the rational
limits of judicial power.145
The difficulty in Kiobel, as in Filartiga, was that nothing in the
case seemed to have any connection with the United States. If that
were so, under both Home Insurance Co. v. Dick and Erie v.
Tompkins, the United States could not apply its law in such a case.
And therefore, under Article III, there was no federal question
under which the case could arise and the jurisdiction appeared to be
unconstitutional. Even Judge Kaufman, writing for the Filartiga
panel, and, in effect, authorizing a federal common-law cause of
action for torture committed by an alien,  understood the jurisdic-146
tional difficulty in a wholly foreign case for a tort in violation of
international law.  What saved the jurisdiction in Filartiga was147
Judge Kaufman’s apparent reliance on universal jurisdiction, with
in Paraguay); id. at 890 (concluding that the case would be “a small but important step in the
fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence”). For discussion of
Filartiga and analogous criminal actions abroad, see Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to
Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 927 (2009).
144. On secondary actions in securities litigation, see supra note 31
145. Note in press: Kiobel has been reargued specifically on this issue. Transcript of Oral
Argument, Kiobel, No. 10-1491, 2012 WL 4486095 (Oct. 1, 2012). On reargument the
conservative justices were particularly concerned with extraterritoriality and the want of
national interest in the case. The discussion in this Part remains pertinent.
146. A return to Paraguay’s courts would have been “futile,” Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880; the
plaintiffs’ lawyer had been jailed in Paraguay for representing them. Id. at 879.
147. Id. at 877.
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a suggested basis in an underlying reciprocal interest shared among
all nations. Judge Kaufman argued, memorably, that “the torturer
has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”  The torturer could and148
should be amenable to civil suit wherever found.
Kiobel in fact is a stronger case for adjudication here than was
Filartiga, because the Nigerian plaintiffs gained asylum in this
country and now reside here;  and the named defendant companies149
are present and doing business in this country. Personal jurisdiction
over them was not transitory. The joint residence of the parties will
have at least an adjudicatory interest in resolving their dispute.150
Nevertheless in the original oral argument in the Supreme Court,
Justice Alito raised the question whether the United States had any
interest at all in the case.  The case was put over for reargument151
in order to deal with this question.152
148. Id. at 890.
149. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 145, at *4:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: What effects that commenced in the United States or
that are closely related to the United States exist between what happened here
and what happened in Nigeria?
MR. HOFFMAN: The—the only connection between the events in Nigeria and
the United States is that the plaintiffs are now living in the United States and
have asylum because of those events, and the defendants are here. There’s no
other connection between the events that took place in the—in Nigeria and the
forum. The—the basis for suing the defendants here was because they are here
and because it was possible to get jurisdiction.
150. Even the after-acquired residence of a plaintiff may have an interest in its new
resident’s compensation for tortious injury, even when the tort occurred elsewhere. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981).
151. Transcript of Oral Argument at *11, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491):
JUSTICE ALITO: [T]he first sentence in your brief in the statement of the
case is really striking: “This case was filed ... by twelve Nigerian plaintiffs who
alleged ... that Respondents aided and abetted the human rights violations
committed against them by the Abacha dictatorship ... in Nigeria between 1992
and 1995.” What does a case like that—what business does a case like that have
in the courts of the United States?
MR. HOFFMAN: Well —
JUSTICE ALITO: There’s no connection to the United States whatsoever. The
Alien Tort Statute was enacted, it seems to be—there seems to be a consensus,
to prevent the United States—to prevent international tension, to—and—does
this—this kind of a lawsuit only creates international tension.
152. Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. at 1738 (“Case restored to calendar for reargument. Parties are
directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question: ‘Whether and under
what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a
cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign
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Notwithstanding Kiobel’s supposed want of connection with the
United States, the question of the constitutionality of the district
court’s jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, as applied in
Kiobel, must have seemed to the Court, as to the corporate defen-
dants below, too easily answered. Formalistically speaking, there is
no Article III problem in Kiobel. The jurisdiction of the federal
courts in both Kiobel and Filartiga arises under federal common law
for purposes of Article III.  The statute vesting the jurisdiction in153
both cases, the ancient Alien Tort Statute,  explicitly contemplates154
an action for a tort in violation of the law of nations, in either set of
courts, and in our courts the law of nations is administered as
federal common law.155
The Court has never approved general federal-question jurisdic-
tion over a case pleadable under the Alien Tort Statute. Filartiga
should be adjudicable as a case arising under federal law within the
meaning of the general federal-question jurisdictional statute,  as156
Judge Kaufman saw,  and indeed in all courts of general jurisdic-157
tion. The statutory federal-question jurisdiction was pleaded in the
similar case of Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority,  a fact that158
went unremarked in the Supreme Court. True, the cause of action
in Palestinian Authority was statutory, under the Torture Victim
Protection Act.  That statute is a narrow codification, with sig-159
other than the United States.’”).
153. Cf. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (holding that federal common law
can ground federal statutory jurisdiction). Of course, in our time any question of federal law
grounds Supreme Court jurisdiction and also evokes federal law and lawmaking power with
respect to the particular federal question in all courts in cases within their jurisdiction.
154. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (“[T]he district courts shall have ...
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case
may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States.”), as codified today at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
155. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“[The
Congress shall have Power To] define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations.”);
id. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under ... the Laws of the United States.”).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
157. Jurisdiction in Filartiga originally rested on § 1331. The Alien Tort Statute, § 1350,
was raised chiefly on appeal. Judge Kaufman “preferred” to rest jurisdiction on § 1350.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980).
158. 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).
159. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified as
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nificant adjustments, of Filartiga. But it should not matter for
purposes either of statutory or Article III jurisdiction whether the
tort pleaded is the statutory tort or the common-law tort —160
although the Court seems to think pleading Filartiga as a federal
question instead of an alien tort would open up the whole universe
of federal common law and import it into Filartiga.161
This is a fallacy. Consider that, except for antitrust jurisdiction,
the general rule is that federal jurisdiction is concurrent with that
of the states unless Congress says explicitly that the jurisdiction is
exclusive. Yet bringing a federal claim in state courts does not
change its substantive nature and limits in any respect. And recall
that the original text of the Alien Tort Statute explicitly conferred
jurisdiction on state as well as federal courts. The head of jurisdic-
tion under which a federal case is brought can have no effect on the
substantive law invoked by the complaint. It remains the same in
all courts, whether it is statutory or arises from a line of cases.
The difficulty expressed by Justice Alito during the first oral
argument in Kiobel was the existence vel non of a national adju-
dicatory interest, and although that question could be decided
formalistically under Article III, as I have shown, and is the right
question, it is a question that essentially reflects a due process
concern that would have to be read into Article III, if, as is most
likely, Article III were held to control it. I would answer that ques-
tion from Judge Kaufman’s point of view, which was tacitly interest-
analytic and as such would satisfy due process. The national
interest that sustained the jurisdiction in Filartiga, and indeed
sustains the Alien Tort Statute altogether, is the universal, shared,
reciprocal interest in enforcing the norms of international law.162
This evidently is the national adjudicatory interest in the assertion
a note to the Alien Tort Statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
160. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101 (1972) (holding that federal common
law will ground federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331). But see Romero v. Int’l
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.) (holding that a nonstatutory
maritime claim cannot ground federal-question jurisdiction, but can be made pendent to a
statutory maritime claim, which can). 
161. For this fallacy, see, for example, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004).
162. Sitting in a then-premier admiralty jurisdiction, I imagine that Judge Kaufman would
have been accustomed, analogously, to the universal venue in admiralty. This presumably
reflects a universal, shared, reciprocal interest among seagoing nations that the quick and
experienced justice of a maritime admiralty court be available wherever a defendant ship, in
rem, or shipowner, in personam, can be found.
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of subject-matter jurisdiction in these cases; this is what satisfies
due process. The constitutional question, then, that we would frame
as an Article III question depends for answer on identifying some
national interest in—some rational basis for—the assertion of
jurisdiction.
The Kiobel Court would find scant precedent for framing its
answer as a matter of due process, however.  It is likely to hold163
either that the Alien Tort Statute has or does not have extraterrito-
rial application—or that Article III does not allow for universal
jurisdiction. Both Kiobel and Filartiga may be considered cases
calling for exercises of universal jurisdiction, based on the univer-
sally shared reciprocal interests of civilized nations. If Kiobel falls,
Filartiga, and the burgeoning body of international human rights
law as administered in this country, falls with it.
There are seemingly powerful prudential arguments that
American assertions of universal jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions and, as in Filartiga, foreign officials, in cases alleging tortious
conduct occurring abroad, can translate into hostile foreign courts
asserting universal criminal jurisdiction over American officials,
military leaders, and American corporations doing business abroad,
in prosecutions charging them with crimes against humanity —164
notwithstanding that Filartiga itself was explicitly limited to cases
of civil liability.  The argument is a disturbing one even so. Yet165
163. But see Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 123, 136-39 (1989) (O’Connor, J.) (holding
the officer removal statute ineffective to ground Article III jurisdiction when the officers in
question were defendants in ordinary motor vehicle cases in state court, although they had
been operating the vehicles in the course of their employment; explaining that the officers
failed to invoke any federal defense, or any party-protective interest of the United States, such
as bias in the state courts). Whether or not this was the right result, Justice O’Connor’s
interest analysis was on the right track. In contrast, see the remarkable flight from analytic
thinking in American National Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 257 (1992) (Souter, J.)
(sustaining Article III jurisdiction over a case against the American Red Cross without
inquiry into the existence of a national adjudicatory interest (actually quite strong); relying
instead on the fact that the legislation chartering the Red Cross mentions federal courts). But
see id. at 265 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (charging the Court with engaging in a jurisprudence of
“magic words”).
164. Cf. MICHAEL HAAS, GEORGE W. BUSH: “WAR CRIMINAL”?: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S
LIABILITY FOR 269 WAR CRIMES (2008); INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CRIMES (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. eds., 2006); STEPHEN MACEDO, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2004).
165. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating the case’s holding as
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declining to adjudicate extraterritorial violations of human rights
here would not necessarily yield similar restraint in hostile foreign
courts seeking to assert universal jurisdiction over our officials and
companies. At most, it would deprive those courts of an argument.
VI. SUPER-GENERALIZATION
A. Rights
We have been discussing the counterintuitive role of due process,
in effect, as a source of governmental authority. But the question of
governmental power arises not only in direct challenges to govern-
mental authority but also in litigation of individual rights, and not
only in defense to an assertion of right but also as the actual source
of rights. This brings us to the concept of substantive due process.
Commentators have objected to “substantive due process” as an
oxymoron.  It is doubtful, however, that many are prepared to strip166
themselves of federal rights against state and local governments,
substantive rights which exist today only through inclusion in the
concept of due process. The project of “incorporating” the Bill of
Rights into the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment  was extended recently to the Second167
Amendment —perhaps, ironically, to the gratification of the pro-168
ject’s critics. But their objection to substantive due process is not, at
root, an objection to incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Rather, their
objection is to rights not enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and only
to certain unenumerated rights.
“for the purposes of civil liability”).
166. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 249-82 (2d ed. 1997); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31-32 (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980); cf. Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality
in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 318 (1999).
167. That substantive due process governs the constitutionality of state action has become,
in large part, a literal fact. See supra note 61.
168. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (incorporating the Second
Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment is one of
individual rather than collective right).
2013] A GENERAL THEORY OF GOVERNANCE 1097
The chief repository of enumerated rights is the First
Amendment, which protects speech, assembly, and religious rights.
The bulk of the Bill of Rights, however, is concerned with pro-
tections afforded to those accused of crime.  It is difficult to believe169
that additional identifiable rights do not exist. If they do, they
would seem to call for judicial protection. The Ninth Amendment
acknowledges the existence of such rights. It states a rule of con-
struction, mandating that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
not be construed in disparagement of rights not enumerated
there.  Surely we have rights to marry, to have children, to seek170
education, to seek gainful employment, to acquire property, and so
on. Even the severest critics of substantive due process would allow
for such rights, perhaps arguing only that the Due Process Clause
is the wrong place in which to lodge them.171
Alternatively, these rights could be considered inherent attributes
of citizenship. They were considered inherent in state citizenship by
judges from earliest times.  Or such rights could be legitimized by172
thinking of them as among the “unalienable rights” mentioned in
the Declaration of Independence.  In this last conception, these are173
natural rights which existed before the Constitution, and the
Constitution necessarily assumed their continued existence, because
they are inalienable.
After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, it was
supposed that both the enumerated and the unenumerated rights
were included among the privileges and immunities of American
citizenship mentioned in the first section of the Fourteenth
169. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII (variously providing rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, self-incrimination, and cruel and unusual punishment; also providing
positive rights to counsel, to indictment by grand jury, to trial by jury, and to confrontation
of witnesses).
170. Id. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
171. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Slaughter-House Cases should be overruled and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
restored as the proper locus of rights against the states).
172. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (listing certain
property and civic rights as examples of privileges and immunities of citizenship within the
meaning of Article IV); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
173. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), available at http://
teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/tansill/declaration-of-independence.html.
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Amendment.  That they are not must be taken as settled, a174
casualty of the Slaughter-House Cases,  in which the Supreme175
Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects only the rights of national, not
state, citizenship—rights for the most part already protected by the
Supremacy Clause in any event. Even so, the Slaughter-House
Court did not endorse the view that the rights of national citizen-
ship included the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  After176
Slaughter-House, the Bill of Rights was no more usable against
state and local government than it had been before.  In effect, the177
Slaughter-House Court stripped the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, whatever the intention of its framers, of any serious
meaning.
In the shadow of the Slaughter-House Cases and their demolition
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, due process ultimately
emerged as the repository of personal liberties as against the states.
And, conversely, rights found only in the Fourteenth Amendment
are assumed applicable, when relevant, as against the nation as
well.  178
174. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89-90 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting)
(referring to an unenumerated “right to pursue a lawful and necessary calling”); id. at 96
(referring to rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property” (quoting the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27)); id. at 112-13 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
privileges and immunities of state citizenship that are extended, under Article IV, to visitors
to the state, are by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
granted to all residents of the state); id. at 118-19 (arguing also that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause embraces the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights).
175. Id. at 36 (majority opinion). The only prominent recent case to find use for the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause was Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501-02
(locating the right to interstate travel within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause). That right had previously been dealt with as a matter of equal
protection. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
176. The Fourteenth Amendment, of course, is about federal constitutional control of the
states. As to rights, the Amendment proceeds with the pivotal words, “No state shall.”
177. Cf. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding the Bill
of Rights inapplicable to the states).
178. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding, in the Washington, D.C.
school desegregation case, that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains an equal
protection component). Today Bolling is commonly read as a “reverse incorporation” of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.
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In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court recognized a host of un-
enumerated rights among the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. These included but went far
beyond Lochner’s “liberty of contract.” Writing for the Court, Justice
McReynolds declared:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness
the liberty thus guaranteed, ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. The established
doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with.179
Justice McReynolds also based Meyer, in part, on an unenumerated
right in the parent to control the rearing of the child.  This right180
of parental control is the wellspring of cases ultimately leading to
the still-controversial modern unenumerated rights of family
planning and sexual privacy.181
Those who object vehemently to a right to reproductive choice
may not have considered how the want of such a right in our
country once permitted forced sterilization,  or, in China, how182
179. 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (McReynolds, J.) (citations omitted). For an investigation
into McReynolds’s unlikely authorship of Meyer, see Louise Weinberg, The McReynolds
Mystery Solved, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 133 (2011).
180. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (“Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty
of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life.”). Justice
McReynolds more specifically elaborated on this right in the follow-up case of Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
181. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that homosexual
couples have a due process right to sexual privacy, striking down a law criminalizing sodomy,
and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164
(1973) (holding that women have a due process right to seek an abortion in the first three
months of pregnancy); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding, as a matter
of due process as well as equal protection, that there is a right to marry the person one
chooses; striking down a state antimiscegenation law).
182. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a statute
authorizing sterilization of habitual criminals as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause);
id. at 543 (Stone, C.J., concurring) (pointing out that the right to bear children is a
fundamental right of all, not of a minority, and that the Equal Protection Clause is inadequate
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want of such a right still permits forced abortion and has led to the
unintended consequence of disappearing baby girls.  Reportedly,183
although it was an old tradition in China to “expose” baby girls to
the elements,  China may be reconsidering its attempt to control184
a family’s desire for children.  Justice Cardozo once declared that185
the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”  It is not clear, however, that this186
formulation adds much to enumerated rights beyond the fact of
their enumeration. And what of rights not enumerated in the Bill of
Rights? How are such rights to be identified? When can an asserted
but unenumerated right serve as a meaningful limit on governmen-
tal power in a court of law? In answer to these questions, the
Justices have given us a piling-up of phrases as famous and as
vague as Cardozo’s. As if to quiet an inner doubt or placate those
who would monitor the liberties of others, Justice Frankfurter
variously described unenumerated rights as strictly limited to those
rights which are “fundamental.”  Of course there are statutory or187
common-law rights that are enforceable yet not ordinarily consid-
ered “fundamental.” But it is rather awkward to suppose that
among the unenumerated constitutional rights there are some that
are enforceable but not fundamental, or perhaps not as fundamental
as others, or as fundamental as those in the Bill of Rights. Yet how
can the right to marry, for example, be less “fundamental” than the
right to a warrant issued on probable cause? Perhaps what we mean
when we say that a right is a constitutional right is that the right
is fundamental.
to protect it).
183. See Edward Wong, Reports of Forced Abortions Fuel Push to End Chinese Law, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2012), http://nytimes.com/2012/07/23/world/asia/pressure-to-repeal-chinas-
one-child-law-is-growing.html.
184. See William L. Langer, Infanticide: A Historical Survey, 1 HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 53
(1974).
185. See China Considers Easing ‘One Child’ Family Planning Rules, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/china-reconsidering-child-rule-
article-1.1209369.
186. Palko v.Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
187. For the earliest fully developed description I have found of the relation of fundamental
rights to due process, see Louise Weinberg, An Almost Archeological Dig: Finding a
Surprisingly Rich Early Understanding of Substantive Due Process, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 163
(2010).
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Justice Frankfurter also variously suggested that unenumerated
rights are those that protect against government acts that “shock
the conscience;”  or that are “deeply rooted” in the “traditions” of188
the “English-speaking peoples.”  In Meyer, Justice McReynolds had189
similarly referred to “those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”190
These formulations seem of scant relevance to the modern rights to
contraception, abortion, or sodomy.  What has been deeply rooted191
and long recognized at common law is moral or religious disapproval
of such matters. The freedoms to use contraception, resort to abor-
tion, or perform acts of sodomy, are liberties that have been only
belatedly, grudgingly, and controversially acknowledged. It is for
this very reason that the Constitution, and a vigilant judiciary, are
needed to protect them.
B. Scrutinizing Scrutiny: The Problem of Economic Rights
Although in Carolene Products the Court extended a generous
presumption of constitutionality to ordinary commercial regulation,
in Footnote Four the Court distinguished certain rights the abridg-
ment of which should be afforded strict judicial scrutiny. Perhaps
this now familiar “tiered” scrutiny might benefit from further re-
finement. The distinction best drawn might not necessarily be a
distinction between economic rights and other constitutional rights.
In theory, Anglo-American legal tradition makes no distinction of
persons. But Footnote Four does. Footnote Four recognizes that
discrete and insular minorities are deserving of particular constitu-
tional protection, perhaps because they can less readily make way
in the scrum of politics.  They have the vote but cannot be pre-192
sumed to vote en bloc; and they may find it difficult to form
coalitions. Perhaps a way can be found to provide a similarly more
188. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
189. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 284 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
190. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (McReynolds, J.).
191. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (citing cases on intimate rights).
192. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (raising the
question whether prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities” may “curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect [them], and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”).
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rigorous scrutiny to government actions affecting economic and
property rights when they are the personal rights of individuals.
In thinking about economic rights, a focus on individuals and
their small businesses and properties would guard against any
weakening of Carolene Products’ deference to reasonable economic
regulation. Such regulation affects corporate “persons” or associa-
tions with sufficient resources to come within the regulatory
intentions of a legislature, and affects whole markets or classes of
workers or industries of interest to Congress. Such actors on the
economic stage generally have sufficient resources to absorb, spread,
or insure against economic harms.
In Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,  the Second Circuit Court of193
Appeals, affirming the district court, authorized an injunction to
protect Texaco from a Texas appellate bond requirement that would
require Texaco to forego appeal unless it deposited billions not
readily available to it.  The Supreme Court reversed,  extending194 195
the doctrine of Younger v. Harris  to bar any such injunction, and196
leaving Texaco to seek the protections of bankruptcy.  Justice197
Marshall concurred separately to express the view that it would be
unconscionable for Texaco to be excused from compliance with the
state’s appellate bond requirement simply because the sum involved
was in the billions of dollars. He argued that parties like Texaco
should be treated with no greater consideration than would be
afforded a “small grocery.”  A small grocery would have been198
forced to meet the bond requirement without question.
193. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
194. Id.
195. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (barring a federal injunction against
a state’s requirement of a bond on appeal as an interference with an important state interest
in securing a judgment for damages).
196. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that principles of equity, comity, and federalism bar
federal injunctions against pending state criminal proceedings). For discussion see Louise
Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977). In Pennzoil, the Court
extended Younger to bar injunctions against state civil proceedings involving an important
state interest even though no “proceeding” was ongoing in the state courts. Pennzoil, 481 U.S.
at 14.
197. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring) (reasoning that Texaco’s right to
appeal would be unaffected by bankruptcy); id. at 32 (Stevens, J., concurring). When Texaco
did file for bankruptcy, Pennzoil settled for a fraction of the value of its claim. See Debra
Whitefield, Texaco Agrees to Pay Pennzoil $3 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1987, at A4.
198. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 27 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Perhaps courts should go further than Justice Marshall and
consider that Marshall’s “small grocery” might well be afforded
more protection than is afforded litigants as powerful as Texaco.
Governmental acts or regulations that may be reasonable and
necessary on the larger scale can be unreasonable and even abusive
as to individuals. It would not be more inappropriate to take this
factor into consideration than it has been to disregard it, for the
very reasons adumbrated in Footnote Four to justify the protection
of discrete and insular minorities. The following discussion of recent
cases may help to make the point.
C. Kelo
The most notorious of recent cases of economic right begging for
some such solution as heightened scrutiny is probably the 2005 case
of Kelo v. City of New London.  There, the Supreme Court, in199
effect, sustained a classic “naked preference”—a taking from A to
give to B.200
In Kelo, on vague, speculative, and underfunded plans,  a rich201
private developer, in the supposed interest of a powerful drug com-
pany, armed itself with the government’s right of eminent domain
to destroy a neighborhood and acquire prime waterfront property
cheaply.202
This had been an old waterfront neighborhood of little houses and
small shops. The neighborhood was free of “blight”—the usual
trigger of redevelopment plans. The taking was effected, rather, in
the supposed interest of putting the land to higher uses and raising
city revenue.  The developer was proposing impressive changes203
199. 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005) (holding that homeowners had no right to stop a taking
of their homes by eminent domain for transfer to a private developer in aid of a private
company, in the speculative interest of redeveloping the land to higher uses and increasing
city’s revenue).
200. Justice Kennedy concurred in Justice Stevens’s opinion in Kelo, providing the fifth
vote for the majority. His was the only opinion in the case not dealing in terms with the
argument that the Court was authorizing a “taking from A to give to B.” But his opinion may
be read as a tacit struggle with the problem of naked preference.
201. Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 596 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (opining that there was scant evidence that the development
plan would ever be realized).
202. Id. at 508-11.
203. Id.
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likely to enhance the drug company’s nearby headquarters: a hotel,
a retail complex, a beautiful marina, and so on.
Most of Susette Kelo’s neighbors accepted modest payments and
moved out, but when Kelo and others refused to sell, the city made
plans to take their houses and shops by eminent domain.  Kelo204
unsuccessfully sought an injunction against the threatened taking,
and when she lost her battle in the United States Supreme Court,
the city handed the little neighborhood over to the private developer
for a decade without serious charge to the developer. Most of the
neighborhood was bulldozed. But as long as Susette Kelo continued
her fruitless fight for rehearing and for costs,  and her sympathiz-205
ers struggled to gain control of the City Council, her pink cottage
was left intact. Then, at the developer’s urging, the city had Kelo’s
cottage moved, stick by stick, to a downtown location.206
Eventually the redevelopment project collapsed for insufficiency
of funds, and today the barren land where a community once
flourished is used as a dump for refuse from a hurricane that roared
through the city in 2011. At about the time when the drug com-
pany’s tax breaks were set to expire, it abandoned the city. Seeing
that it had nothing to show for all this destruction and had now lost
the revenue and charisma that Kelo’s scenic little neighborhood had
provided, the city council held three days of commemorative events
and dedicated Kelo’s pink cottage as a museum.207
In Kelo, the Supreme Court more clearly established that, even
in cases of economic redevelopment for private use, the Fifth
Amendment’s requirement of “public use” will be satisfied by the
speculation that a “public purpose” may be served. This is so even
when the property taken is a flourishing neighborhood which will be
destroyed, even when the “public purpose” is little more than the
assertion that a better class of property owners might pay higher
taxes. It is assumed that there is a “public purpose” when an
attempt is made to put land to more expensive use. In dissent,
204. Id. 
205. See Kelo v. City of New London, 546 U.S. 807 (2005) (denying costs); 545 U.S. 1158
(2005) (denying rehearing).
206. See JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND COURAGE
(2009). Kelo did not want to live there and now resides in some other part of Connecticut.
207. See Scott Bullock, Susette Kelo’s Little Pink House Finds a New Foundation, INST. FOR
JUST. (June 2008), http://www.ij.org/susette-kelos-little-pink-house-finds-a-new-foundation-2.
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Justice O’Connor warned that “[t]he specter of condemnation [now]
hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from re-
placing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with a factory.”  Justice O’Connor added, “As for208
the victims, the government now has license to transfer property
from those with fewer resources to those with more.”209
It is somewhat surprising that it was the liberal wing of the Court
that, with Justice Kennedy’s swing vote, approved this taking. The
explanation may lie in the fact that current American liberalism has
roots in the New Deal, when the struggle was to discourage judicial
review—to let the government govern. The problem with such views
in this case is that the Kelo plaintiffs did not comprise a standard
Footnote Four exception to that general rule. No discrete and
insular minority was targeted. The Court saw only economic prop-
erty rights at stake. And yet it is obvious that a taking of the homes
and shops of individuals can incur costs, tangible and intangible,
that are not covered by “just compensation.” These costs suggest
that it is essential that such takings, at least when affecting the
personal rights of individuals, occur only to meet the necessities of
actual “public use,” and that courts need to provide not only sub-
stantial scrutiny of such takings, but both prospective and general
retrospective relief.
The Kelo plaintiffs suffered intangible but real losses. They lost
homes in which some of their families had lived for generations.
They lost the sentimental attachments to every room, their
cherished waterfront views, their familiar neighbors, the comfort
and security of their familiar neighborhood, and the right to go
about their usual lives without a permanent disruption and
irrevocable change. As for money losses, plaintiffs in cases like Kelo
lose the costs of their attempt to fight a taking, and the income from
the small businesses on which they and their families have
208. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 505. Justice Thomas dissented even more angrily:
Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad
enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any
economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall
disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only
systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use,
but are also the least politically powerful.
Id. at 521 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
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depended.  They lose the difference between the market value of210
their homes and the low appraisal at which “just compensation” too
often is afforded. If they oppose the taking, the authorities some-
times turn around and claim back rent for the years of their
struggle, as reportedly occurred in Kelo.  These sorts of costs,211
which can be spread or absorbed or insured against by larger
businesses, can be devastating to individuals and their families.
The reaction to Kelo, nationwide, has been outrage. The political
backlash was immediate and has been widespread and persistent,
amounting to a legislative revolution. Some forty-four states (and
still counting) have enacted Kelo reform legislation of varying
degrees of effectiveness.  In 2006 President Bush issued a Kelo212
reform executive order applicable to federal agencies, and in the
spring of 2012 the House of Representatives sent a Kelo reform bill
to the Senate.213
Heightened scrutiny of the economic rights of individuals might
have avoided the result in Kelo if it could have induced a healthier
skepticism about the wherewithal for the grandiose but vague plans
the developer presented to the city. But heightened scrutiny could
not guarantee an injunction for the Kelo plaintiffs. A more direct
and effective course might be to recognize that “just compensation”
is not an adequate legal remedy, and to provide easier access to an
injunction in cases alleging irrevocable harm when there is to be a
taking of the property of an individual for no public use; or, if it is
too late for that, to allow damages for intangible and future harms,
as well as known monetary harms and costs. The due process
pleadings of the parties should not be ignored; these sorts of takings
are deprivations not only of property but of liberty. Dissenting in
210. See Mark D. Obenshain, Property Rights Need Constitutional Protection, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/property-rights-need-
constitutional-protection/article_4650f198-6b1a-5e29-a28b-29e9e14e43a1.html (pointing out
that “just compensation” does not include the costs of fighting eminent domain or, when small
shops are taken, does not include lost income and resultant family distress).
211. This Land Was Your Land: City Wants Back Rent from Kelo Residents, WND (Aug. 20,
2005, 1:00 AM), http://www.wnd.com/2005/08/31873/.
212. The chief problem appears to be that most Kelo reforms make an exception for blight,
and “blight” turns out to lie in the eye of the beholder. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Controlling the
Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 184
(2007).
213. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2012, H.R. 1443, 112th Cong. (2d Sess.
2012).
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Kelo, Justice O’Connor can be read to have suggested as much,  as214
could Justice Thomas.215
D. Astrue
A very different problem arises when the government deprives an
individual of a statutory economic benefit. When a legislature
creates a property interest, the expectation is that courts will
scrutinize the deprivation quite strictly, particularly when the case
is treated as one of constitutional right rather than statutory
interpretation.  It is important, among the complexities such cases216
can present, to consider such factors as the degree of dependency of
the individual upon the entitlement, and the importance to society
and the economy that the beneficiary not be denied the particular
entitlement. Government can rarely be justified in withholding a
statutory entitlement from an individual dependent on it, not only
because broad interpretation is inherently necessary in such cases
but also for consequential reasons. Society generally benefits when
the costs of caring for dependent individuals are not permitted to
fall on the individual or those who must care for her, or on the lim-
ited resources of some charity. Thus, speculation concerning fiscal
needs or administrative burdens generally should not be held to
justify deprivation of a statutory entitlement upon which the
individual deprived of the benefit is dependent. Denials of welfare
benefits, for example, are likely to receive substantial judicial scru-
tiny.217
This brings us to the case of Astrue v. Capato.  The following218
brief account of Karen Capato’s litigation against Commissioner
214. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
permitting a taking for solely private use; suggesting the necessity of considering the
intangible harms caused by takings in economic redevelopment cases).
215. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is backwards to adopt a searching standard
of constitutional review for nontraditional property interests, such as welfare benefits, ...
while deferring to the legislature’s determination as to what constitutes a public use when it
exercises the power of eminent domain, and thereby invades individuals’ traditional rights
in real property.”); id. at 522-23 (terming the urban renewal of the 1970s “negro removal” and
complaining that the majority had cleared the way for the transfer of properties from people
without the wherewithal for long legal battles with powerful private entities).
216. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
217. Id.
218. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
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Michael J. Astrue of the Social Security Administration is a
composite one taken from the below-cited judicial opinions in the
case. Shortly after Karen and Robert Capato were married, Robert
was diagnosed with cancer of the esophagus. Chemotherapy offered
a slim chance to save him but was likely to make him sterile if it
did. Although Robert had two children from a previous marriage,
the couple wanted children from their own marriage. Robert there-
fore began to make contributions to a sperm bank. Miraculously, the
couple conceived naturally and bore a son. The Capatos asked their
lawyer to make a change in Robert’s will to clarify that all his
children should share equally in whatever he could leave them upon
his death, but their lawyer neglected to make the change. They also
prepared a notarized document specifying that any children born to
Karen after Robert’s death should be understood to be his children
with all the rights of his other children.  Robert died soon thereaf-219
ter. The grieving widow turned to the sperm bank, and with the
assistance of in vitro technology bore twin children of Robert
eighteen months after his death. Thereafter, under a statutory
insurance program, into which Robert had paid part of his wages
throughout his working life, she applied to the Social Security
Administration for support for her five children. Support was
allowed, but not for the in vitro twins.220
 It is disturbing that in Astrue, the unanimous Supreme Court, by
Justice Ginsburg, found no unconstitutional deprivation of property
in the Social Security Administration’s denial of benefits. The twins
were dependent minor survivors of a deceased wage earner. They
met all statutory requirements.  Their decedent parent had221
consistently paid into the statutory survivors’ benefit insurance
scheme.  The agency did not contest the fact that the statutory222
requirements were fully satisfied by Karen Capato’s twins.
219. Id.
220. Id. For early discussion, see Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How
Cryopreservation Has Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen
Short, and How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347 (2011).
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (2006) (Title II of the Social Security Act); id. § 402(d)(1)
(providing benefits to dependent minors surviving the death of a “fully or currently insured
individual”). The purpose of these insurance benefits for dependent minors is not to provide
general welfare benefits but to help replace support the child would have received from its
father’s wages had the father not died. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1976).
222. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2033. 
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Because these children satisfied all statutory requirements, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals  vacated a judgment of the223
district court denying the children their benefits.  The court of224
Appeals refrained from characterizing the district court’s judgment
as absurd, but treated it as absurd. The court of appeals could see
no reason for the Social Security Administration to strip the Capato
twins of paid-for statutory insurance.
True, under the Social Security Act, when there is some doubt
about qualification, the Social Security Administration is directed
to consult state intestacy law to see if the children could qualify
under that legislation. But if that does not help, there are further
ways a child can qualify, including a showing of actual dependency
at the time of death of the father. None of these alternatives render
the statute “ambiguous,” as the district court supposed.  These225
latter alternatives are clearly fallback provisions—Congress’s at-
tempts to make certain that the proceeds of the father’s paid-for
insurance go to the child. And so the Court of Appeals held.226
The trouble was that successive commissioners of the Social
Security Administration had opposed benefits for all in vitro chil-
dren. There were at least a hundred such cases pending at the
time.  When, back in 2004, in a factually identical case,  the227 228
Ninth Circuit had reached the same result the Eleventh Circuit
would reach in Karen Capato’s case, the commissioner at the time
had filed a notice of “acquiescence,”  announcing that his agency229
would not comply with the Ninth Circuit’s decision beyond its terri-
torial scope. The commissioner made clear that the agency viewed
state intestacy law as the gatekeeper to Social Security survivors’
insurance benefits, however well qualified a child might be under
the federal statute itself. Commissioner Astrue’s position was in line
with this history. 
223. Id. at 2033-34.
224. Capato v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 626 (11th Cir. 2011).
225. Capato v. Astrue, No. 08-5405, 2010 WL 1076522 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2010).
226. Capato v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d at 630.
227. James Vicini, U.S. Top Court Decides In Vitro Fertilization Benefits, REUTERS (May
21, 2012, 10:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/us-usa-socialsecurity-benefits-
idUSBRE84K0SD20120521.
228. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
229. See Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005).
1110 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1057
The position had nothing to do with deference to the states’
traditional authority over the definition of the word “child.” Rather,
the agency’s point was that children like the Capato twins simply
were not statutory children. The statute did not mention posthu-
mous children conceived by means of in vitro technology.230
State intestacy laws, like Florida’s in this case, tend to be hard on
posthumously born children, but if the child is born in wedlock,
some states hold the statute inapplicable. The problem addressed by
those laws that are applied even if a child is conceived in wedlock is
evidentiary. How can the state confidently say that the deceased
was indeed the claimant’s father? Would the deceased have wanted
some other man’s child to share his own children’s inheritance?
Needless to say, such a statute should not bar an inheritance if
DNA testing proves the paternity of the decedent.  The statute231
would be equally inapplicable if it is the mother who has died and
there is no question of her maternity. Similarly, the Florida statute
should have no rational application in cases like Karen Capato’s.
Any evidentiary reason for stripping posthumous children of
inheritance rights was irrelevant in the Capato case—the paternity
of the decedent sperm donor father was known, provable, and
conceded, as was the certainty of the twins dependency on him had
he survived.  The only nonevidentiary reason for state law denying232
posthumously born children inheritance rights—to protect the
patrimony of actual offspring from the grasp of those having no
relation to the decedent —simply vanishes in cases like Capato’s,233
in which the paternity of the decedent sperm donor is known. But
Commissioner Astrue was contesting all such cases, the irrelevance
of state intestacy law notwithstanding. 
Writing for the unanimous Court in Astrue, Justice Ginsburg
produced an appallingly unconvincing opinion, swallowing
Commissioner Astrue’s every proposition. She insisted that the
statute was ambiguous, although the Court of Appeals had shown
that it was not. Because the statute was ambiguous, Justice
Ginsburg concluded that the statutory fallback reference to state
230. The silence of the statute on this point is not mysterious. There had been no such
technology when the legislation was enacted.
231. See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r, 760 N.E.2d 257, 266-67 (Mass. 2002).
232. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025-26 (2012).
233. Id. at 2033.
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law was called for, and that that reference satisfied “rational-basis”
review.  She reasoned that using state law as a gatekeeper in234
every case would alleviate the administrative burden upon the
agency of proving dependency on a case-by-case basis.  Justice235
Ginsburg did not explain how consulting fifty different state laws
would be less burdensome than simply following the language of the
existing single federal law, the requirements of which the Capato
children fully satisfied. She did not say why the agency’s conve-
nience, if indeed there were a convenience problem, should trump
the statutory obligation toward infant dependents of a wage earner
to provide the needed support their father had paid for and
Congress had authorized.
Justice Ginsburg also accepted Astrue’s argument that denials of
benefits under state intestacy laws helped the agency to husband its
funds for better-qualified children. To be sure, in the abstract, the
preservation of scarce funds for better-qualified recipients might
make fiscal sense. But in the specific case of the Capato twins, there
were equally dependent siblings. Recall that there was a naturally
conceived son of the Capato’s, and two children of his earlier
marriage. There was no way of husbanding the twins’ support to
better the lot of the other three children in the family. The denial to
the twins would instead result in deprivation to the other children,
who would then have to share their support, meager in any event,
with their less fortunate siblings. 
Shockingly, the Astrue Court held unanimously that the agency’s
funds should be husbanded to support only naturally conceived
children, and that the happenstance of state law determines
whether a child is naturally born.  Apparently Congress intended236
that in vitro babies must, if state intestacy law so decrees, be left to
fend for themselves.
Yet the Supreme Court has at least twice held it a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause for a state to discriminate among classes
of children.  The counterargument, with which both the Ninth and237
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2027.
236. Id. at 2033-34. 
237. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding it a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
to bar undocumented immigrant children from the public schools); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (placing equal protection limits on discrimination against illegitimate
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Eleventh Circuits regrettably agreed,  is that this discrimination238
is no discrimination at all, because not all posthumous children are
denied benefits, but only those disqualified by state intestacy law.
Yet it is hard to see why discrimination against a subclass of post-
humously born infants is more justifiable than discrimination
against all posthumously born infants, when the subclass has no
rational relation to the child. No amount of creative subclassing can
save Astrue from its denial of equal protection. Tellingly, Justice
Ginsburg ventured to remind us, as if in extenuation, that economic
rights invoke only rational-basis review:
Under rational-basis review, the regime Congress adopted easily
passes inspection. As the Ninth Circuit held, that regime is
“reasonably related to the government’s twin interests in
[reserving] benefits [for] those children who have lost a parent’s
support, and in using reasonable presumptions to minimize the
administrative burden of proving dependency on a case-by-case
basis.”239
I think the reader at this point would question the rationality of
these “rational bases.” The Capato children had lost a parent’s
support. That they would have been dependent on Robert, had he
survived, was conceded—there was no administrative burden in
proving it. But even if a burden of proving dependency existed in
this case, the inability of posthumously born offspring to inherit
under state law could not rationally alleviate a burden of proving
dependency. State intestacy laws apply to self-supporting adults as
well as minor children and do not necessarily contain a requirement
of dependency. The governmental purposes that should matter are
the primary purposes of a challenged act. Abridgments of right
should not be justifiable for reasons that are hypothetical or spec-
ulative or irrelevant.
children).
238. See Capato v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 626, 628 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We will affirm the
dismissal of Ms. Capato’s Equal Protection claim. As the Ninth Circuit found in a similar
challenge, ‘the [Social Security Administration] is not excluding all posthumously-conceived
children, only those that do not meet the statutory requirements under State law.’” (alteration
in original) (citing Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009))).
239. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2033.
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In the end, Justice Ginsburg fell back on the general rule that
federal courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of the
statute it administers.  The Astrue Court certainly deferred to240
Commissioner Astrue’s views in every respect. But deference to an
irrational and discriminatory interpretation cannot be due process;
and abridgment of right should not be held justified by speculative
suppositions of administrative or fiscal burdens.241
Beyond these considerations, the case appears an offense to
justice as well as reason. It could not have been the intention of
either Congress or the twins’ father that his payments toward their
support, together with their benefits, necessary to the well being of
the other children as well, be confiscated by the government. The
Court should not have shrugged off the equal protection problem the
case presented, and certainly should have seen the unreason of the
collateral harm to the twins’ siblings. Counsel and the courts
involved throughout should have seen identified deprivations of
property and liberty to the Capato family within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, although Capato
sought statutory benefits, not damages.
Damages could not fully remedy the personal harms caused by
the Dickensian hardness of government in cases like Astrue, or, for
that matter, the recklessness of cronyism that one sees in cases like
Kelo. When the personal economic rights of individuals are at stake,
a more probing scrutiny of the strength of governmental interest,
the appropriateness of the means employed, and the seriousness of
the injury caused might have saved the Justices the embarrassment
of such decisions, and the moral indignation of those who become
aware of them.
240. Id. at 2033-34 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).
241. For recent discussion of fiscal justification, see, for example, Armour v. City of
Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2086 (2012), and Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1999). On
administrative justification, see Justice Scalia’s recent discussion in Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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E. A “Theory of Everything”? (Why the Bill of Rights Is Alive and
Well)
To mock the extravagance of the claimed unifying and analytic
advantages of the Due Process Clauses, a skeptic might raise some
interesting questions: Why bother with a Bill of Rights? Why bother
with unenumerated rights? Why not discard Article I? Why not rely
on due process to encompass all constitutional claims?242
Of course, no unconstitutional law or act can be due process.243
Moreover, due process already does substantively protect virtually
every right, enumerated and unenumerated, because it is held to
incorporate them, making them usable against both state and
federal officials. But if our skeptic would like to see some formal
“limit,” there certainly is one, at least as to substantive due process.
The Due Process Clauses belong to a class of legal protections
against unspecified “deprivations” or “wrongs.” The class includes,
for example, wrongful death statutes,  the Civil Rights Act of244
1871,  and, on the criminal side, the federal crime of aiding and245
abetting.  Although such texts create liabilities, they refer to rights246
defined elsewhere. A wrongful death statute or the Civil Rights Act,
standing alone, would not ground a claim on which relief could be
granted. These sorts of statutes require separate pleading of the
particular “wrong” or “deprivation” that is the gravamen of a
complaint. In the same way, a substantive due process deprivation
of liberty is typically a deprivation of some more specific constitu-
tional right.247
242. This important question, in part, was raised from the floor by a participant in this
Symposium, directed in the first instance to Kermit Roosevelt, who kindly said that he had
gotten his due process thinking from me, passing the buck. The inquirer might well have
added, “And how can the source of powers also be the source of rights, which are the limits
of powers?” But he did not.
243. This was my initial response in real time to the question raised supra note 242.
244. Every state has a wrongful death statute, following the general outline of Lord
Campbell’s Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.). Under the influence of Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (holding that an action for wrongful death is available
in admiralty as a matter of federal common law), nonstatutory wrongful death has also
become available in some states. See, e.g., Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
247. In criminal prosecutions the enumerated rights tend to be procedural ones.
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The right pleaded can be an enumerated one, like the right to
freedom of speech, or an unenumerated one, like the right of sexual
privacy. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Washington v.
Glucksberg, a substantive due process claim is limited, at the
threshold, by the requirement that it refer to some specific funda-
mental right.248
This is not to say that a bare substantive due process claim of a
deprivation of liberty, unaccompanied by a more specific claim of
right, is unimaginable. The second Justice Harlan’s conception of
due process was free of reference to any more specific right.  A249
claim of a violation of bare due process that is a deprivation of
liberty can be a simple deprivation of some procedure, usually reme-
diable by providing the procedure or remitting the plaintiff to it. It
can also be a challenge to governance that is arbitrary or irrational.
This last category can cover a range of increasingly serious depriva-
tions, from an irrational choice of law to application of law that is
irrational in itself. In Glucksberg, Justice Souter, concurring, argued
that, instead of considering whether there was a fundamental right
to die, the Court should consider whether the state’s criminalization
of assisted suicide constituted an “arbitrary and purposeless
restraint”  within Justice Harlan’s meaning.  But the Court250 251
rejected this suggestion. The Court has not adopted Justice Harlan’s
view that substantive due process “rides on its own bottom.”252
1. The Arizona Immigration Case
To my mind the closest Supreme Court case furnishing an in-
stance of simple irrationality as a substantive deprivation of liberty
248. 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (stating that, in triggering strict scrutiny,
there is “a threshold requirement [ ] that a [due process] challenge [to] state action implicate
a fundamental right”); e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a
statute prohibiting sodomy as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the unenumerated right of sexual privacy that is part of the “liberty” the Due Process
Clause protects).
249. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
250. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
251. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
252. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“While the
relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights,
it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.”).
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is Plyler v. Doe —although Plyler was decided on equal protection253
grounds and engaged specific liberties. Plyler should have figured
heavily in Arizona v. United States,  the Arizona immigration case254
the Court recently handed down, and would have, if the case below
had been pleaded, briefed, argued, and decided on the merits, rather
than on the arid technicalities of preemption doctrine.
The several Justices filing opinions in Plyler had been baffled by
the sheer irrationality of a Texas law that would have blocked
access to public schooling for the children of undocumented immi-
grants. In effect, the law would inevitably create a class of street
urchins and a permanent underclass of unemployable illiterates.255
Concurring, Justice Powell perceived a further piece of unreason in
the law’s punishment of children for the sins of their parents.  The256
consequentialist argument—that the challenged state law would
create an illiterate underclass—is a policy argument; but it also is
relevant to an evaluation of the state’s interest in denying an
essential public good to resident children.
Perhaps because the Plyler Court was unwilling to say that a free
public education is a fundamental right, or that alienage is an
inherently suspect classification, it decided the case as a matter of
equal protection, applying only rational-basis scrutiny. But even
minimal rational-basis scrutiny was sufficient to expose the law’s
sheer irrationality.
Due process might have been superior in Plyler to the Court’s
equal protection rationale. Texas’s asserted interest lay in discour-
253. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (requiring the state, under the Equal Protection Clause, to
admit children of undocumented immigrants to public schools). The opinion and concurrences
in Plyler severally note the irrationality of denying education to resident children,
documented or not. But see, e.g., Guaman v. Velez, 23 A.3d 451, 452 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2011) (ruling that the plaintiffs, legal resident aliens, were unlikely to prevail in their
challenge to the constitutionality of state termination of their medical benefits).
254. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding three provisions of an Arizona immigration law
preempted; remanding the notorious “show your papers” provision for further consideration).
But see Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (holding
that Arizona’s requirement that employers check the immigration status of employees
survives a preemption challenge). Yet Arizona, unlike the United States, criminalized
violations of the employment provisions of its law. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497-98. As litigated,
briefed, and argued, these cases, focusing on preemption, failed to reach the question of the
constitutionality not only of the Arizona law, but also of the federal law.
255. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J.); id. (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 234
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring). 
256. Id. at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring).
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aging the presence of undocumented immigrants within its
borders.  Even assuming this to be a legitimate governmental257
interest, and not a mere expression of animus to the class, the
means chosen were fatally irrational.
Plyler may not be as clear an example of bare substantive due
process as I have been supposing. Rather, thinking about Plyler
suggests that education is, in fact, a fundamental right as well as a
prime concern of every state. The attempt to deprive undocumented
resident children of that right strongly suggests the value of due
process for the case. Equal protection is hardly a substitute for due
process where rights of this magnitude are concerned.  A salient258
feature of Plyler, in both its equal protection and implicit due
process aspects, was the state’s reckless disregard of the injury its
law would inflict on the lives and fortunes of the most vulnera-
ble—the children—of a very vulnerable class of persons—undocu-
mented immigrants. The federal trial judge, William Wayne Justice,
was outraged by this. In Plyler, Justice Brennan thought him worth
quoting:
As the District Court observed ..., the confluence of Govern-
ment policies has resulted in “the existence of a large number of
employed illegal aliens, such as the parents of plaintiffs in this
case, whose presence is tolerated, whose employment is perhaps
even welcomed, but who are virtually defenseless against any
abuse, exploitation, or callous neglect to which the state or the
state’s natural citizens and business organizations may wish to
subject them.”259
257. Id. at 243-44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] state has a legitimate reason to
differentiate between persons who are lawfully within the state and those who are unlawfully
there.”); cf. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“As a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude persons from its territory, subject
only to those limitations expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by
Congress. That power to exclude has long been recognized as inherent in sovereignty.”).
258. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a statute criminalizing sodomy, thus
overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); see also, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Warren, C.J.) (striking down an antimiscegenation law as a denial of equal
protection, and further ruling that in view of the fundamental nature of the right to marry,
the law in question also deprived interracial couples of their liberty within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
259. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.18.
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A due process case involves not only assessment of the abridg-
ment of some specified right but also analysis of the government’s
reasons for the alleged abridgment. If the government acts without
good reason, or if its reasons fail to justify the extent of the harm, or
if the means used to effectuate them are irrational—in Plyler the
means were actually destructive to the state’s higher interests—it
should not matter whether or not the pleader can find some more
specific or fitting “right” to plead. Plyler comes close to illustrating
Justice Harlan’s view that due process can “ride on its own
bottom.”260
In the Arizona immigration case, part of the state’s immigration
law made it a crime for an undocumented alien to seek work,
although this conduct—seeking work—was “only” subject to civil
penalties under federal law.  On this ground, the Supreme Court261
struck down the Arizona law as preempted by federal law.  But the262
case would have been better handled had the Supreme Court
ordered reargument to address the substantive constitutionality of
both state and federal laws. The preemption question could not
begin to touch on the unreason and sheer destructiveness of law
that would discourage lawful employment and invite underground
or criminal activity. The preemption question could not address the
evil of a law that would operate to deprive any person within its
jurisdiction of the fundamental right to seek otherwise lawful and
gainful employment. The deprivation need not be complete. Threats
inhibiting and obstacles to the exercise of this right would be
equally irrational and unconstitutional.
2. Other Writers
I have tried to show in this Article the usefulness of due process
and its interest-analytic methodology for thinking about questions
of the allocation of governance in a federal union. I have tried to
show the ways in which interest analysis addresses the question of
governmental power in the litigation of rights, and to show, further,
that governmental interest is the source of governmental power.
260. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
261. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503, 2505.
262. Id. at 2510-11.
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I am finding that other writers have considered theory similar in
part to the general due process theory proposed here.  These263
writers typically reject general due process theory. They fear a
possible world in which a general theory makes the Bill of Rights
superfluous. They point to the valuable separate specificity of each
right in the Bill of Rights, each with its own doctrinal history, tests,
maxims, great cases, bits of memorable language—the myriad trea-
sures that the past bequeaths to the present.
My proposal here, however, is certainly not to abandon the Bill of
Rights, to which we are all committed, and certainly not to abandon
the United States Reports. Indeed, I have shown that the Due
Process Clause scarcely works unless it is accompanied by some
identified more specific right.  Rather, my effort has been to show264
how due process thinking—governmental interest analysis—can
help to provide a stronger foundation in reason for the uses we make
of the past. 
Purposive interest analytic inquiry is likely to work better than
definitional and formulaic analysis. The American legal realists
taught us that abstractions inevitably place the thinker at a remove
from the real stakes in a case.  To the extent this is so, the path265
forward would lie in consciously acknowledging the analytic frame-
work invoked by due process thinking, and using that framework to
help us in thinking about problems of constitutional law. To the
extent reason can help to justify the wisdom of the past, surely
reason, in turn, can be sustained and nourished by it.
VII. ENVOI
We have fairly arrived at a general unified theory descriptive not
only of the allocation of lawmaking power in our federalism but
263. See, e.g., Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012). For criticism of general due process theories, see, for
example, Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 339 (1957); Yale Kamisar, How Much Does It Really
Matter Whether Courts Work Within the “Clearly Marked” Provisions of the Bill of Rights or
with the “Generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 513
(2009); John E. Nowak, Foreword—Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation World,
70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 400-01 (1979).
264. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
265. See generally MORTON WHITE, THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949).
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of much of substantive governance as it is tested under the
Constitution. Although interest-analytic thinking has long been
second nature to lawyers, judges, and commentators, somehow we
have not fully internalized its significance. We go on speaking a
different language, one of formalisms and abstract categories, when
this is what we mean—have meant—all along.
Some scientists say that they are seeking a “theory of everything,”
some foundational set of principles to which all accumulated
knowledge of nature reduces in a profoundly satisfying chain of
explanation.  John Donne expressed the hopefulness of reduc-266
tionist thinking centuries ago:
These three houres that we have spent,
Walking here, two shadowes went
Along with us, which we our selves produc’d;
But, now the Sunne is just above our head,
We doe those shadowes tread;
And to brave clearnesse all things are reduc’d.267
Unlike science or sunlight, however, law is not only about what
is but about what should be. A general way of looking at most
constitutional questions, like the one proposed here, may seem
simplistic, a piece of arrant reductionism. We would think it naïve
to suppose that we could take even one of the subjects discussed
here and pitch it on some single methodological trope.
But the due process theory outlined in these pages, with its
attendant purposive, interest-analytic methodology, is general
enough, I think, yet specific enough, to be of real use. At the very
least it can discourage modern misuses of Erie, and more realisti-
cally describe the American two-law, two-court system as it is
experienced by lawyers and judges. Beyond this, it can help us
understand the relation of due process to substantive rights. Due
process and its interest-analytic method provide a foundation in
reason for thinking not only about the rights of individuals, but also
266. See, e.g., STEPHEN W. HAWKING, THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING: THE ORIGIN AND FATE
OF THE UNIVERSE 147 (2006).
267. JOHN DONNE, A Lecture upon the Shadows, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF JOHN DONNE
50, 50 (Roy Booth ed., 2002).
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the bounds of individual rights. It thus can enlarge an understand-
ing of the sources, nature, and limits of governmental power.
This way of thinking has long been available, and in some ways
it is very familiar. It needs only to be perceived to be understood—if
not as the key to constitutional jurisprudence, then at least as a
light at the gate.
